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Abstract 
Leaders around the world have introduced various trade policies including subsidies, 
tariffs, anti-dumping duties or price undertakings throughout the trade history. These trade 
policies have benefitted states in different ways. For example, some countries achieved economic 
development by supporting their firms through various subsidies and helping them to enhance 
their product qualities and become competitive in the international market. Whereas, in other 
cases leaders engage in imposing tariffs - a policy helps leaders to protect their producers and 
generate revenue. Such trade policies are not only limited to the benefits; however, they may 
incur costs too.  As such, the imposition of trade policies affects the social welfare of all parties 
engaged in trade. Recently, we have seen that US-China engaged in a trade war where the United 
States has imposed tariff duties against China, and China responded with its tariffs on US 
products. This trade war has affected the social welfare one way or another. Such trade practices 
in the past have led scholars to address questions related to trade policies. Despite the work on 
trade policies, there is still a wide variety of questions yet to be answered regarding trade 
policies. This dissertation address three important questions related to international trade policies 
and their impact on social welfare.    
The first chapter is motivated by the observation of the quality difference between 
imported and local products in Pakistan. This chapter addresses the question of whether import-
competing markets where foreign products are of high quality, are domestic firms doomed to 
produce low-quality products? What are policy options available to an importing country 
government that has the multiple objectives of maximizing consumer surplus, domestic profit 
and welfare, besides generating product quality reversal? Using a duopoly framework of vertical 
product differentiation, we analyze and compare three policy options: an import tariff, free trade, 
  
and a quality-upgrading R&D subsidy. We identify the conditions under which the quality-based 
R&D subsidy policy is a win-win-win strategy in that consumer surplus, domestic profit, and 
social welfare are all at their maximum levels, in addition to product quality reversal.  
The second chapter is motivated by the contemporary US-China trade war and its welfare 
implications. This paper analyzes differences in welfare implications between import tariffs and 
antidumping (AD) duties within a unified model of trade in quality-differentiated products under 
international duopoly. Specifically, the model allows for product quality choices by two 
competing firms located separately in a developed country (DC) and a less-developed country 
(LDC), where there is a different degree of international market competition. We show that 
dumping arises as an LDC firm sells a low-quality product that is “dumped” into the DC market. 
Compared to import tariffs, imposing AD duties (based on the dumping margin) by the DC 
government makes its firm better off. Whether DC consumers are better off and whether there is 
welfare improvement for DC are shown to depend on the degree of market competition. We 
further identify conditions under which a tariff policy is preferred over an AD policy (or the 
other way around) from the world perspective of welfare.  
The third paper  investigates which types of firms (DC or LDC) tend to practice dumping, 
using a two-market equilibrium model of trade in “like” products with quality differentiation. 
Specifically, within the framework of duopolistic competition between a DC firm and an LDC 
firm, we show that the DC firm sells a high-quality product without practicing dumping. In 
contrast, the LDC firm sells a low-quality product that is dumped into the DC market at a price 
less than the price of the product in its LDC market. The imposition of antidumping duties by the 
DC government increases domestic welfare. It is welfare increasing to LDC when its exporting 
firm accepts a price-undertaking, rather than practicing dumping. From the perspective of world 
  
welfare, defined by aggregating the welfare of DC and LDC as trading partners, the trade 
damage measure of an antidumping policy is Pareto superior to free trade (under which dumping 
takes place) and price-undertakings.   
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dumping arises as an LDC firm sells a low-quality product that is “dumped” into the DC market. 
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Chapter 1 - Import Competition, Product Quality Reversal, and 
Welfare 
1. Introduction 
 Voluminous studies have contributed to our understanding of strategic trade policy and 
endogenous choice of product quality by firms in imperfectly competitive markets.1Recognizing 
the contributions in the literature, we observe two important questions that are constantly 
challenging firms and policymakers in importing countries. In import-competing markets where 
foreign products are of high quality, are domestic firms doomed to produce low-quality 
products? What are policy options available to an importing country government that has the 
multiple objectives of maximizing consumer surplus, domestic profit and welfare, besides 
generating product quality reversal? This paper attempts to provide preliminary answers to the 
questions.     
 The present study complements the recent contribution of Kováč and Žigić(2014). The 
authors examine trade policy and R&D investment for product quality improvement when an 
import-competing market is partially covered. We analyze the case of a full covered market 
where each individual purchases either an imported or a domestic product, which is considered 
as a necessity to all consumers in an importing country.2 We introduce a quality-upgrading 
equation for each firm. This approach permits us to derive reduced-form solutions for optimal 
 
1See, e.g., Das and Donnenfeld (1987), Flam and Helpman (1987), Krishna (1987), Reitzes (1992), Motta, Thisse, 
and Cabrales (1997), Herguera, Kujal, and Petrakis (2002), Zhou, Spencer, and Vereinsky (2002), Moraga-Gonzalez 
and Viaene, (2005),  Amiti and Khandelwal (2013), and Kováč and Žigić (2014). 
2 We borrow the assumption of a full covered market from the literature that uses a vertical product differentiation 
framework (see, e.g., Cremer and Thisse, 1994; Crampes and Hollander, 1995; Wauthy 1996; Ecchia and 
Lambertini, 1997; Maxwell 1998; and Andaluz, 2000). 
2 
levels of quality upgrades, R&D investments, firm profits and domestic welfare, as well as an 
optimal government policy in the case of a three-stage game. We analyze and compare three 
policy options: an import tariff, free trade, and a quality-upgrading R&D subsidy. We find that a 
tariff policy does not serve the dual purposes of domestic welfare maximization and product 
quality reversal. Moreover, we show that among the three regimes, unless the domestic firm's 
quality-upgrading R&D investment is extremely cost-ineffective, the quality-based subsidy 
policy is able to encourage the domestic firm to undertake R&D investment for achieving quality 
reversal, with the result that consumer surplus, domestic profit and welfare are all at their 
maximum levels.  
1.2. The Model 
1.2.1 Basic Assumptions 
 We consider an import-competing duopoly market where foreign and domestic firms 
produce vertically differentiated products and engage in Bertrand price competition. Denote fp  
and dp  as the prices of the products charged by the foreign and domestic firms, respectively. In 
the market, consumers are uniformly distributed over a unit line, [0,1].   Each individual buys 
one unit of the product, which is a necessity to all consumers in the importing country. The 
indirect utility of consumer   is specified as follows:  
 
 if buy the foreign product;
( )
  if buy the domestic product.
f f
d d
q p
V
q p



−
= 
−
           (1) 
where iq  represents product quality for firm i ( , ).i f d=  To allow for the possibility of 
upgrading product quality through investment, we assume that 
 1f fq s= +  and 1d dq s= + ,                (2) 
3 
where ( 0)is   represents "quality upgrade" resulting from R&D by firm i ( , ).i f d=  This 
implies that in the absence of quality upgrades by the firms ( 0),f ds s= =  each one's product 
quality is normalized to one ( 1).f dq q= =  
 Empirical findings suggest that 0,f dq q   i.e., foreign product quality is relatively 
higher.3 Based on (2), this implies that 0.f ds s   In our analysis, the levels of quality 
upgrades fs and ds  are endogenously chosen by the firms. As in the R&D investment literature, 
each firm's quality-upgrading expenditure is taken to be a quadratic form: 2 2,i i iE s=  where 
parameter i  reflects the cost-effectiveness of investment for firm i  ( , ).i f d= 4 Following 
Kováč and Žigić(2014), we define parameter   as the degree of technological spillovers where 
[0,1).  
 Given consumer heterogeneity in tastes for quality that [0,1],   the marginal consumer 
who is indifferent between the two products implies that (1 ) (1 ) .f f d ds p s p + − = + −  The 
critical value of   is ˆ ,
f d
f d
p p
s s

−
=
−
 which means that ˆ1 0   for 0f dp p   and 
0.f ds s   Market demands for the foreign and domestic products are: 
 ˆ( , ) 1 1
f d
f f d
f d
p p
D p p
s s

−
= − = −
−
 and ˆ( , ) .
f d
d f d
f d
p p
D p p
s s

−
= =
−
        (3) 
 
3See, e.g., Amiti and Khandelwal (2013). Quality-upgrading investment is endogenously determined by each firm in 
our analysis, but we consider that the inequality condition holds initially in order to see what effective measures 
would be available to an importing country for generating product quality reversal.  In other words, it is the 
objective of this paper to uncover such measures or policies. 
4That is, the lower the value of i  the higher the cost-effectiveness of R&D investment. 
4 
 Utilizing this framework of vertical product differentiation, we examine three policy 
options: (i) an import tariff, and (ii) free trade, and (iii) a quality-upgrading R&D subsidy.  
 
1.2.2 Three Policy Options 
1.2.2.1 Import Tariff 
Under tariff protection, there is a three-stage game. At stage one, the firms determine 
quality upgrades, { , },f ds s that maximize their respective profits, with the foreign firm being the 
quality leader and the domestic firm being the quality follower. At stage two, the domestic 
government determines an optimal tariff rate, ,t on the foreign import. At stage three, the firms 
set their optimal prices { , }f dp p  by engaging in Bertrand competition. We use backward 
induction to solve for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.  
At the price competition stage, the firms solve their profit-maximization problems:5 
2
{ }
1
Max ( )  where 1 ;
2f
f dTARIFF
f f f f f f
p
f d
p p
p t D s D
s s
 
−
= − − = −
−
         (4a) 
2
{ }
1
Max [ (1 ) ] where and [0,1).
2d
f dTARIFF
d d d d d d
p
f d
p p
p D s D
s s
   
−
= − − = 
−
      (4b) 
The first-order conditions (FOCs) for the firms imply that the equilibrium prices are: 
2( ) ( )
 and  .
3 3
f d f d
f d
t s s t s s
p p
+ − + −
= =            (5) 
Substituting (5) back into (3) yields the product demands: 
2( )ˆ1
3( )
f d
f
f d
s s t
D
s s

− −
= − =
−
  and 
( )ˆ .
3( )
f d
d
f d
s s t
D
s s

− +
= =
−
         (6) 
 
5 As in Kováč and Žigić (2014), we assume zero production costs for analytical simplicity in order to focus the 
analysis on costly R&D investments by the competing firms.  
5 
At the policy stage, the government determines a specific tariff to maximize social 
welfare, which is taken to be the sum of overall consumer surplus (from the domestic and foreign 
products), domestic profit (net of its R&D cost), and tariff revenues. That is, 
ˆ(1 ).TARIFF TARIFF TARIFFdSW CS t = + + −  The government solves the following problem:     
ˆ 1
2
{ }
R
ˆ0  
1ˆ ˆMax [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ] [ (1 ) ] (1 ) ,
2
TARIFF
TARIFF d
Tariff ev
TARIFF
d d f f d d d
t
C
enues
S
SW s p d s p d p s t



       = + − + + − + − − + −   
where prices and demands are given in (5) and (6). The optimal tariff is calculated as  
* ( ) 0f dt s s= −   when .f ds s              (7) 
At the R&D stage, the firms optimally determine their quality upgrades. Being the quality 
follower, the domestic firm determines ds  as a function of .fs  The FOC for the domestic firm is: 
4
[ (1 ) ] 0,
9
TARIFF
d
d d
d
s
s

 

= − + − 

which implies that 
0.TARIFFds =                 (8) 
Thus, quality-upgrading investment is unprofitable to the domestic firm since R&D expenditure 
is zero 2( 2 0).d d dE s= =  This may explain why many firms in developing countries show no 
interests in costly R&D investments for quality improvement. 
The foreign firm determines an optimal quality upgrade fs  that maximizes its profit 
function.  It follows from (4a), (6), and (7) that   
2
2[( ) 2 2 ] 1 .
9 )
 
( 2
f d f dTARIFF
f f f
f d
s s s s
s
s s
 
− − +
= −
−
 
Solving for the optimal quality upgrade yields   
1
0,
9
TARIFF
f
f
s

=                 (9) 
6 
which implies that the foreign firm's R&D expenditure on product upgradation is:  
 2
1 1 1
( ) 0.
2 9 162
Tariff
ff
f f
E 
 
= =   
The resulting equilibrium prices and welfare are calculated as follows: 
4
,
27
TARIFF
f
f
p

=
2
,
27
TARIFF
d
f
p

=
4
,
81
TARIFF
d
f


=  and 
27 1
54
fTARIFF
f
SW


+
= .    (10) 
 
We thus have  
PROPOSITION 1. Despite the imposition of a specific tariff on foreign product whose quality 
is relatively higher in an import-competing market, the domestic firm has no incentive in product 
quality upgradation. 
The result in Proposition 1 is consistent with several studies that empirically test how 
import tariffs affect quality reversal. For example, Feenstra (1988) investigates imports of 
Japanese compact trucks and finds that there is no sustained quality upgradation despite the 
increased tariffs. In analyzing trade policy and quality upgradation in developing economies, 
Moraga-González and Viaene (2005) find that import tariffs help to reap foreign rents but do not 
help for quality reversal.6 
 1.2.2.2 Free Trade  
Under free trade, there is a two-stage game. At stage one, the firms determine their 
quality upgrades (and hence R&D investments). At stage two, the firms set their product prices 
by engaging in Bertrand competition. 
 
6Lenway, Morck, and Yeung (1996) examine the effect of protectionism on innovation in American Steel Industry. 
Though the study did not specifically focus on the tariffs as a protectionism policy, it does suggest that 
protectionism in steel industry discourage innovation that eventually lead the firms to exit. 
7 
At stage two, the firms solve their profit-maximization problems:   
2
{ }
1
Max 
2f
FT
f f f f f
p
p D s = −
 and 
2
{ }
1
Max (1 )( ).
2d
FT
d d d d d
p
p D s  = − −
 
It is easy to verify that the optimal prices are: 
2( )
0
3
f d
f
s s
p
−
= 
  and 
0.
3
f d
d
s s
p
−
= 
           (11) 
Substituting (11) back into (3) yields the product demands:  
2ˆ1
3
fD = − =
 and 
1ˆ .
3
dD = =
            (12) 
At stage one, the firms optimally determine their quality upgrades. The profit 
maximization problems of the firms are: 
2
{ }
1
Max 
2f
FT
f f f f f
s
p D s = −
 with 
2( )
3
f d
f
s s
p
−
=
and 
2
;
3
fD =
 
2
{ }
1
Max (1 )
2d
FT
d d d d d
s
p D s  = − −
 where 
( )
3
f d
d
s s
p
−
=
and 
1
.
3
dD =
 
Solving for the optimal quality upgrades yields  
4
0
9
FT
f
f
s

= 
and 
0,FTds =              (13) 
which imply that the firms' R&D expenditure on product upgradation is: 
21 8( ) 0
2 81
FT FT
f f f
f
E s

= = 
 and 
0.FTdE =  
Thus, R&D investment is profitable to the foreign firm, but not to the domestic firm. 
Making use of (11)-(13), we calculate the equilibrium prices and domestic profit:  
8
,
27
FT
f
f
p

=
4
,
27
FT
d
f
p

=
 and 
4
.
81
FT
d
f


=
           (14) 
8 
We then calculate domestic welfare, which is 
.FT FT FTdSW CS = +  It follows from (12)-
(14) that 
ˆ 1
2
ˆ0
1 1ˆ[(1 ) ] [(1 ) ] [ (1 ) ] .
2 2
FT
FT d
FT
d d f f d d d
CS
SW s p d s p d p s



      = + − + + − + − − = 
(15) 
PROPOSITION 2. In an import-competing duopoly market where foreign product is of 
higher quality, the domestic firm has no incentive to undertake costly R&D for product quality 
upgradation under free trade. 
1.2.2.3 Quality-upgrading R&D Subsidy 
Under this subsidy policy, there is a three-stage game. At stage one, the government 
commits an industrial policy under which total subsidy (S) to the domestic firm is proportional to 
its quality upgrade.  That is, dS s=  where  represents a subsidy for each unit of quality 
upgrade.7At stage two, the foreign and domestic firms determine their quality upgrades (and 
investments). At stage three, the firms engage in Bertrand competition. 
At the price competition stage, the profit-maximization problems of the firms are: 
& 2
{ }
1
Max 
2f
Q R D
f f f f f
p
p D s − = −   and & 2
{ }
1
Max [ (1 ) ] .
2d
Q R D
d d d d d d
p
p D s s   − = − − +  
Solving for the optimal prices yields   
2( )
 
3
f d
f
s s
p
−
= and .
3
f d
d
s s
p
−
=           (16) 
Substituting (16) back into (3) yields the product demands:  
 
7It should be noted that evaluating government-sponsored programs such as R&D subsidy is technically difficult 
due to the complicated linkages between policy input and performance output (Hsu et al, 2009). To tackle this 
problem, concept of additionality is adopted in order to determine the additional work of the firms involved in R&D 
programs after being supported by the public funds, that would not have otherwise happened (Luukkonen, 2000). 
The aforementioned studies rely on behavioral and output additionality approach to examine the impact of R&D 
subsidy.  It has been found that government R&D subsidy does stimulate the private firms to invest more in R&D 
programs and improves their product quality. 
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2ˆ1
3
fD = − =  and 
1ˆ .
3
dD = =            (17) 
At the R&D stage, given (16) and (17), the profit-maximization problems of the firms are: 
& 2
{ }
4( ) 1
Max 
9 2f
f dQ R D
f f f
s
s s
s −
−
= −     
& 2
{ }
( ) 1
Max (1 ) .
9 2d
f dQ R D
d d d d
s
s s
s s   −
−
= − − +  
Solving for the optimal quality upgrades yields 
& 4 0
9
Q R D
f
f
s

− =   and 
& 1 0,
2 (1 )
Q R D
d
d
s
 
− = 
−
       (18a) 
which implies that the domestic firm's R&D investment for quality upgradation is positive: 
& & 2
2
1 1
( ) 0.
2 8 (1 )
Q R D Q R D
d d d
d
E s
 
− −= = 
−
        (18b)  
The results in (18) indicate that the government's quality-based R&D subsidy policy is 
effective in promoting the domestic firm's R&D activities for quality upgradation.8 
Making use of (16)-(18), we calculate equilibrium prices and domestic profit: 
&
9 8(1 )
,
27 (1 )
f dQ R D
f
f d
p
  
  
−
− −
=
−
&
9 8(1 )
,
54 (1 )
f dQ R D
d
f d
p
  
  
−
− −
=
−
&
81 32(1 )
.
648 (1 )
f dQ R D
d
f d
  

  
−
+ −
=
−
    
(19) 
 
8Some interesting cases may serve as examples to show the positive impact that government R&D subsidies have on 
private R&D activities for product quality improvement. Lach (2002) examines Israeli manufacturing firms and 
evaluates how firms would have spent on R&D in the absence of subsidy. The result posits that R&D subsidies do 
create a positive incentive for smaller firms to undertake investments in R&D for product improvement. In 
analyzing subsidy effectiveness in Spanish manufacturing firms, González, Jaumandreu, and Pazó (2005) find that 
government subsidies to small firms significantly promote their innovative activities. These firms would not 
undertake R&D without government support. Investigating a manufacturing industry in Eastern Germany, Czanitzki 
and Licht (2006) document that government R&D subsidies positively stimulate private firms' use of innovation 
input and encourage them to launch R&D for product improvement. 
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At the policy stage, the government determines a subsidy rate  that maximizes 
domestic welfare: & & & .Q R D Q R D Q R Dd dSW CS s 
− − −= + − The government solves the following 
problem:  
&
ˆ 1
& 2
{ }
ˆ0
1ˆMax [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ] [ (1 ) ] .
2
Q R D
Q R D
d d f f d d d d d
CS
SW s p d s p d p s s s



        
−
− = + − + + − + − − + −   
where prices, demands, and investments are given in (17)-(19). The FOC for the 
government yields the optimal per-unit subsidy: 11 18.  =  The equilibrium welfare is 
calculated as 
& (4 ) 1.
8(1 )
Q R D d
d
SW
 
 
− − +=
−
            (20) 
We thus have  
PROPOSITION 3. An industrial policy designed to provide subsidies for quality-based R&D is 
effective in encouraging the domestic firm to undertake quality upgradation, compared to the 
cases under tariff protection and free trade.  
 
1.3. Comparison and Policy Recommendations 
 In this section, we conduct a comparison of the three alternative regimes. We first look at 
the firms' quality upgrades. It follows from (9), (13), and (18a) that  
& 0.Q R D FT TARIFFf f fs s s
− =    
In response to the quality-based R&D subsidies to the domestic firm, the foreign firm set a 
higher level of quality upgrade &( )Q R Dfs
− relative to its choice under the tariff policy. 
For the domestic firm, we have from (8), (13), and (18a) that 
& 0.Q R D TARIFF FTd d ds s s
−  = =  
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As mentioned in Proposition 3, the subsidy policy is effective in encouraging the 
domestic firm to invest in quality upgradation. More importantly, this quality-based subsidy 
policy is capable of generating product quality reversal if the following condition is satisfied: 
 & &Q R D Q R Dd fs s
− −  if 
9
.
8(1 )
d
f

 

−
 
We, therefore, have  
PROPOSITION 4. Quality reversal ( & &Q R D Q R Dd fq q
− − ) is more likely to emerge when (i) the cost-
effectiveness of the domestic firm's R&D investment relative to that of the foreign firm's is 
greater and (ii) the degree of technological spillovers is higher. 
 An examination of consumer surplus for the three regimes reveals that9 
 & .Q R D FT TARIFFCS CS CS−    
This implies that consumer surplus ranks the highest under the quality-based subsidy policy. For 
a comparison of domestic profit, we have from (10), (15), and (19) that  
 & .Q R D TARIFF FTd d d  
−  =  
Domestic profit is thus at its highest level under the quality-based subsidy policy. Finally, we 
look at domestic welfare. It follows from (10), (15), and (20) that  
&TARIFF Q R D FTSW SW SW−   if  
27
;
4(1 )
d
f

 

−
        (21a) 
&Q R D TARIFF FTSW SW SW−    if 
27
.
4(1 )
d
f

 

−
         (21b) 
 
9Overall consumer surplus for the three regimes are calculated as follows: (81 11) (162 ),TARIFF f fCS  = −
(81 8) (162 ),FT f fCS  = − and  
& [99 (162 16 )(1 )] [324 (1 )].Q R Dd f f d d f dCS        
− = + − − −  
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Under the subsidy policy, domestic welfare ranks the highest when the cost-effectiveness 
of the domestic firm's quality-upgrading R&D investment is sufficiently high, as shown in (21b). 
We thus have   
PROPOSITION 5. Among the three policy options we consider, unless the domestic 
firm's quality-upgrading investment is extremely cost-ineffective, the quality-based R&D subsidy 
policy is able to generate product quality reversal. As a result, consumer surplus, domestic profit, 
and domestic welfare are all at their maximum levels.10 
1.4. Conclusion 
This paper has contributed to the literature by explicitly identifying the conditions under 
which there is product quality reversal for domestic firms in import-competing markets. The 
conditions are shown to depend on the relative cost-effectiveness of quality-upgrading R&D 
investments between domestic and foreign firms, and the degree of technological spillovers. 
Moreover, we derive the conditions to show that an importing country's quality-upgrading R&D 
subsidy policy is effective in achieving a win-win-win equilibrium in which consumer surplus, 
domestic profit, and social welfare are all at their maximum levels, due to product quality 
reversal.    
 
  
 
10 Note that we use a linear form of subsidy for analytical simplicity and tractability.  An alternative approach is to 
examine the case where an R&D subsidy for quality improvement is proportional to a firm's R&D expenditure. In 
this case, we can find conditions under which there is product quality reversal such that consumer surplus and social 
welfare are at their maximum levels.  But domestic profit turns out to be lower under the expenditure-based R&D 
subsidy than under import tariff and free trade regimes.  We thank an anonymous referee for the valuable suggestion 
to investigate this alternative approach.    
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Chapter 2 - Dumping, Antidumping Duties, and Price 
Undertakings: Policy Implications of Trade in Quality-
Differentiated Products 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 Unfair trade practices such as dumping products into U.S. markets continue to make 
business news headlines and appear to show no signs of abating. Dating back to 2011, Whirlpool 
Corporation, an American manufacturer of household appliances, filed a petition to the U.S. 
International Trade Commission (ITC) against cheap imports of South Korean and Mexican 
washing machines. Later in 2013, the ITC documented that Mexican manufacturers were 
dumping washing machines on the U.S. market at about 36% to 72% below their local market 
prices, and South Korean manufacturers undercut the prices by 9% to 82%. The ITC's findings 
further confirmed that such unfair trade practices by the Mexican and South Korean 
manufacturers materially injured the U.S. companies. Consequently, the U.S. government 
imposed antidumping (AD) duties on both Mexican and South Korean washers at 72% and 82%, 
respectively.11 The use of AD duties by the U.S. government was not limited to products like 
washing machines. In 2014, the U.S. Commerce Department imposed AD charges against 
exporters of solar panels from China after finding that the products were sold at low prices, 
which significantly hurt U.S. manufacturers.12 These cases exemplify the practices of dumping 
 
11 See Press Release,  Whirlpool Corp., "Victory for American Washer Industry: Ruling Supports U.S. Workers and 
Consumers" (2013) at: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/victory-for-american-washer-industry-ruling-
supports-us-workers-and-consumers-188052991.html. See, also, Reuters (2012) and Metal Bulletin (2014). 
12 See Reuters (2014). 
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products at lower prices in a developed country (DC), where its government opts for policy 
choices such as antidumping duties as unfair trade remedies.13 
 From the global perspective of trade, there are significant issues concerning (i) which 
types of firms (DC or LDC) tend to practice dumping and (ii) whether DC or LDC governments 
are likely to launch antidumping investigations into imports. How is dumping related to trade in 
“like” products with quality differentiation? Given the growing concern over the large-scale 
dumping of cheap products to DCs, would LDCs be better off if governments restrain their 
exporting firms not to practice dumping? Is the use of antidumping duties effective in protecting 
domestic firms and is it proved to be a welfare-improving policy for its economy? How would 
the Pareto superiority of free trade in the world trading system be affected by the global dumping 
of low-quality products? Can world welfare (defined by aggregating the welfare of DC and LDC 
as trading partners) be higher under an AD policy than under free trade in the presence of 
dumping? In this paper, we answer these questions by developing a two-market equilibrium 
analysis of trade in quality-differentiated products. 
 In retrospect, voluminous academic studies have contributed to our understanding of the 
issues on dumping and antidumping regulations.14Recognizing the contributions in the literature, 
 
13Note that the use of antidumping duties is not restricted to DCs, as recently some LDCs started imposing AD 
duties on exporting firms from DCs. For details on traditional (DCs) and new antidumping duty users (LDCs), see 
the systematic analysis and review by Blonigen and Prusa (2016).  
 
14Viner (1923) is among the first to define dumping as the practice of international price discrimination. 
Contemporary studies on dumping under the traditional antidumping law include Prusa (1992, 1994, 2001), Fischer 
(1992), Reitzes (1993), Anderson, Schmitt, and Thisse (1995), Blonigen and Prusa (2003), Gao and Miyagiwa 
(2005), Dinlersoz and Dogan (2010), and Wu et. al. (2014). For studies that address issues on the political economy 
of antidumping see, e.g., Finger, Hall, and Nelson (1982), Tharakan (1991), and Nelson (2006). For recent issues on 
antidumping such as the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act implemented by the U.S. government under 
15 
we follow the GATT/WTO guidelines to determine conditions under which dumping arises by 
comparing the equilibrium prices of products sold by DC and LDC firms.15 The equilibrium 
price comparison for a product sold in both DC and LDC markets helps identify the firm type 
(DC or LDC) that practices dumping.16 For analyzing international duopoly under free trade, we 
employ a two-stage game where quality choice is determined before the firms engage in price 
competition in both the DC and LDC markets. We consider that consumers in the two markets 
are characterized by inter-country income differentials (i.e., there are different degrees of market 
competition). Within the two-way trade model of competition in quality-differentiated products 
between DC and LDC firms,17 we show that the DC firm sells a high-quality product due to its 
economic incentive to invest in R&D for quality improvements. In contrast, the LDC firm sells a 
low-quality product as it does not engage in R&D for quality upgradation. These results are 
consistent with the empirical findings that a DC firm's strategic choice of product quality is 
relatively higher than that of an LDC firm (Amiti and Khandelwal 2013). Moreover, our results 
 
which the revenues from AD duties are redistributed to domestic firms alleging harm see, e.g., Collie and 
Vandenbussche (2006), and Chang and Gayle (2006). For issues concerning antidumping measures and economic 
effects see, e.g., Vandenbussche and Wauthy (2001), Pauwels and Springael (2002), Belderbos et al. (2004), Moore 
(2005), and Ishikawa and Miyagiwa (2008). Blonigen and Prusa (2016) present a systematic review on dumping and 
antidumping activity. 
15The “technical information on dumping” put forth by the GATT/WTO on its official website permits member 
countries to identify circumstances under which dumping in international trade emerges.  It states that:  
“Dumping is, in general, a situation of international price discrimination, where the price of a product when sold in 
the importing country is less than the price of that product in the market of the exporting country. Thus, in the 
simplest of cases, one identifies dumping simply by comparing prices in two markets.” 
16 The analysis does not rely on the usual assumption of an exogenously-determined “normal value” for a dumped 
product in a one-market analysis. 
17 Our analytical framework is fundamentally similar to a North-South trade model where one firm in the North (a 
developed country) competes with one firm in the South (a less developed country) in both the northern and 
southern markets. That is, the DC-LDC trade is equivalent to the North-South trade.  
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show that the DC firm does not practice dumping, whereas the LDC firm dumps its low-quality 
product into the DC market by setting a price less than the product's price in its local market. 
These results suggest that, in international price competition, dumping is a signal of low product 
quality.  
 Our model of trade in like products with quality differentiation permits us to see how 
consumers and producers in two trading partner countries (DC and LDC) are affected by 
alternative trade regimes (free trade, antidumping, and a price-undertaking). The bilateral trade 
analysis suggests that both DC’s consumers and producers gain the highest surplus respectively 
by consuming and producing more of the high-quality good when their government imposes AD 
duties against the dumping action of the low-quality producing LDC firm. Consequently, DC's 
overall welfare is the highest under the anti-dumping policy. However, DC consumers and 
producers confront the highest economic costs when their government offers a price-undertaking 
to the LDC’s firm, which it accepts. Thus, the win-win-win equilibrium associated with AD 
duties may explain why under the auspices of antidumping regulations, the U.S. government 
favors the use of AD policies, rather than granting the option of price-undertakings to foreign 
dumpers.18 
 As for effects on LDC, we find that LDC consumers are better off when the DC 
government imposes AD duties than when there is free trade. The economic reason behind this 
 
18 It is instructive to mention at the outset that, practically, authorities may not pursuit social welfare maximization 
as an objective in setting an optimal AD duty. In our study, we aim to see whether authorities' practice or mode of 
regulation (e.g., free trade, an AD policy, or a price taking) can be explained by the equilibrium outcomes under 
welfare maximization. One possible reason why AD protection is opposed is that it explicitly ignores overall 
welfare, which we mean consumers, producers, and government revenue. This promotes us to consider welfare 
maximization as a country's objective when choosing an optimal policy in response to unfair trade practices such as 
dumping.  
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result is as follows. Under an AD policy, gains in consumer surplus by consuming an imported 
product with a relatively higher quality (due to DC's R&D investment in quality improvement) 
outweigh the losses in consumer surplus through consuming the low-quality product with an 
increased price. However, LDC’s firm enjoys the highest surplus by dumping a low-quality 
product under free trade, regardless of the inter-country income differential (countries are 
different in terms of their income levels).Third, LDC's overall welfare is the highest when its 
exporting firm accepts a price-undertaking, but is the lowest when the exporter dumps its low-
quality product and pays AD duties. 
 From the perspective of world welfare, calculated by aggregating the welfare of trading 
partners (DC and LDC in the present study), we show that the trade damage measure of 
imposing AD duties is Pareto superior to free trade (under which dumping takes place) and 
price-undertakings. Our analysis provides a theoretical justification for the use of duties against 
foreign dumping which, in turn, suggests that an AD policy is fundamentally WTO-consistent 
from the world perspective of welfare. 
 This paper contributes to the literature by (i) identifying the firm type (DC or LDC) that 
tends to practice dumping and (ii) showing whether DCs or LDCs are likely to launch AD 
actions against foreign dumpers. Prusa (2001) documents empirically that until the 1980s 
approximately 95% of the AD disputes are initiated by DCs against imports from LDCs. 
Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2008) find that the later trend shows that LDCs are also highly 
involved in AD actions. Bown (2011a, b) indicates that AD actions are generally concentrated 
across traditional users(DCs) and new AD users (LDCs).19 Interestingly, Bown (2013) further 
 
19 Traditional AD users (DCs) include the United States, the European Union, Canada, and Australia, whereas the 
leading new users include Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Turkey (Blonigen and Prusa 2016). 
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remarks that most of the new AD disputes launched by LDCs have targeted imports of cheaper 
products from other LDCs -- the so-called “South-South protectionism.”20 Blonigen and Prusa 
(2016) document systematically that, based on the size of AD duties, DCs remain to be the 
largest AD policy users against the unfair practices of dumping by firms from LDCs.Hansen and 
Neilsen (2009) show that differences in the quality of products lead high-quality firms to solicit 
for tariff protection, which suggests that product differentiation makes AD policy more 
beneficial to the firms manufacturing and exporting products of high-quality (that is, the 
developed world). 
 It should be mentioned at the outset that our analysis of unilateral dumping by an LDC 
firm deviates from the reciprocal dumping model of Brander and Krugman (1983) in two crucial 
respects. First, we examine trade in quality-differentiated products, while Brander and Krugman 
examine trade in an identical product without allowing for quality differentiation. Second, we 
look at trade between a DC and an LDC with an inter-country income differential, which reflects 
a different degree of international market competition. Brander and Krugman analyze trade 
between two DCs with similar or identical economies. The contribution by Flam and Helpman 
(1987) is among the first to analyze north-south trade in vertically differentiated products, but 
their focuses are on issues other than dumping.  
 
20 We also consider whether our model of a DC-LDC (North-South) trade, where there is an income differential 
between a DC and an LDC, can be applied to an LDC-LDC (South-South) trade model when two trading LDCs 
differ in their national incomes and engage in imports and exports of quality-differentiated products. In the latter 
case of an LDC-LDC trade, we infer that an LDC firm from a relatively higher income country sells a product of 
relatively higher quality and does not practice dumping. In contrast, the other LDC firm from a relatively lower 
income country sells a “like” product of relatively lower quality and practices dumping. In terms of initiating AD 
disputes, we can apply the findings of this paper and predict that there is “LDC-LDC protectionism” or “South-
South protectionism” as the case examined in Bown (2013).  
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 Our present paper is closely related to the recent contribution of González and Viaene 
(2015), which adopts a vertical product differentiation approach to analyzing issues on dumping 
behavior and antidumping regulations. The key differences between the two studies should be 
mentioned. First, our results indicate that, under free trade, the LDC firm produces a low-quality 
product that is dumped into the DC market. Dumping thus is a signal of low quality. In contrast, 
Gonzales and Viaene (2015) find that DC firm dumps a high-quality product into the LDC 
market. Second, our analysis shows that the use of AD duties by the DC government improves 
its domestic welfare, as well as the aggregate welfare of the world (i.e., DC and LDC taken 
together). This result is different from the finding of Gonzales and Viaene (2015) that an AD 
policy by the LDC government improves its domestic welfare at the expense of world welfare. 
 We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. In Section 2, we first lay out an 
analytical framework of trade in quality-differentiated products to analyze competition between a 
DC firm and an LDC firm in both of their markets. We consider three different trade regimes: 
free trade with the presence of dumping, an antidumping policy, and a price undertaking. In 
Section 3, we compare firm profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare in DC and LDC under 
alternative trade regimes. Section 4 contains policy implications and concluding remarks.  
 
2.2. A Model of Trade in Quality-Differentiated Products 
2.2.1 Basic Assumptions 
To be consistent with the GATT/WTO guidelines on dumping, we present a two-market 
analysis to compare the equilibrium prices of a product sold in both home and foreign countries 
(i.e., DC and LDCdue to their income differentials).We first identify conditions under which 
dumping arises, and then evaluate the resulting impacts on DC and LDC under different trade 
regimes. Specifically, we consider a model of trade under international duopoly in which a DC 
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firm and an LDC firm produce “like” products with vertical differentiation and compete in their 
domestic markets, as well as in the markets abroad. 
The firm located in DC, where consumers are relatively more affluent in the market, will 
be shown to manufacture and export a high-quality product. For notational convenience, we 
denote variables for the DC firm with a subscript “h,” representing that its product quality is 
high. The firm located in LDC, where consumers are relatively less affluent in the market, will 
be shown to manufacture and export a low-quality product. We denote variables for the LDC 
firm with a subscript “l,” representing that its product quality is low. We adopt the plausible 
assumption that DC consumers have relatively higher incomes on average than LDC consumers, 
other things (e.g., product quality and consumer preferences) being equal. This assumption 
allows us to introduce a parameter (0,1) that reflects the degree of inter-country income 
differential. We shall show that this approach helps determine the condition under which 
dumping takes place. 
2.2.1.1 LDC market 
 We first look at the market in an LDC where consumers are uniformly distributed along a 
unit line, [ , 1],a a  +  for 0.a  Each consumer purchases one unit of a product (domestic or 
foreign), which is taken to be a necessity to all citizens in the LDC.21 Denote hp  as the price of 
the high-quality product and lp  as that of the low-quality product in the LDC market. Following 
the literature on vertical product differentiation, we specify the indirect utility function of an 
LDC consumer located at point as follows: 
 
21 That is, we consider the case of a full covered market.  This consideration is consistent with the literature that uses 
a vertical product differentiation framework (see, e.g., Crampes and Hollander 1995; Wauthy 1996; Andaluz 2000; 
Chang and Raza 2018). 
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where iq  represents product quality of firm ( , ).i h l=  
 To allow for the possibility of product quality upgradation through a firm's costly R&D 
investment, we follow the approach in Chang and Raza (2018) by assuming that 
1 ,i iq s= +                      (2) 
where ( 0)is   denotes “quality-upgrade” resulting from R&D by firm ( , ).i h l=  The absence of 
quality-upgrades ( 0)h ls s= =  by both firms implies that product quality is standardized or 
normalized to one ( 1).h lq q= =  Several empirical studies posit that 0,h lq q   which means that 
the DC firm's strategic choice of product quality is higher than that of the LDC firm's.22 That is, 
0.h ls s  In our analysis, each firm's quality-upgrade decision is determined endogenously. As 
in the R&D investment literature, we postulate that each firm's quality-upgrading expenditure is 
a quadratic form: 2 2,i i iE s=  where parameter ( 0)   denotes the cost-effectiveness of 
investment by firm ( , ).i h l=  
Given LDC consumers' heterogeneity in tastes for quality, [ , 1],a a  + the marginal 
consumer who is indifferent between the high-quality product and the low-quality product 
implies that (1 ) (1 ) .h h l ls p s p + − = + −  Solving for the critical value of   yields 
ˆ ( ) ( ) ,h l h lp p s s = − −  where ˆ1 0   for 0h lp p   and 0.h ls s  It follows that demands 
for the low- and high-quality products in the LDC market are: 
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22 See, e.g., Amiti and Khandelwal (2013). 
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Note that market demand for the high-quality product, ( , ),h h lD p p  defines the LDC 
import. 
2.2.1.2 DC market 
For the DC market, we use a superscript “*” to denote all the related variables. We 
assume that there is a uniform distribution of DC consumers over a unit line, * [ , 1],a a  + with 
each consumer buying one unit of a product which is a necessity. Denote *hp as the price of the 
high-quality product and *
lp  as that of the low-quality product in the DC market.  
As addressed earlier, there is an income differential between DC and LDC, which is 
captured by the parameter (0,1). We specify the indirect utility function of a DC consumer 
located at point * as follows: 
* * *
*
* * *
 if consumer buys high quality product at ;
( )
 if consumer buys low quality product at .
h h h
DC
l l l
q p p
V
q p p



−
= 
−
         (4) 
The use of   in (4) follows directly from the notion of Tirole (1988) that consumer taste 
for quality is inversely related to the marginal utility of income. This indicates that, other things 
being equal, the marginal utility of consumption is relatively lower in DC than in LDC. An 
income differential between DC and LDC thus implies that * ,i iq q   for 
* =  and a given 
level of product quality ( , ).i h l=  The parameter   reflects the degree of market 
similarity/dissimilarity between DC and LDC. There are two cases of interest: (i) When the value 
of  increases and approaches 1, the DC and LDC markets resemble each other such that the 
degree of international competition is high. (ii) When the value of   decreases and approaches 
to 0, the two markets increasingly become dissimilar such that the degree of international 
competition is low. We shall demonstrate that   (as the degree of market 
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similarity/dissimilarity) plays a role in characterizing price competition for trade in quality-
differentiated products between the DC and LDC firms.       
Given quality upgradation for the competing firms ( 1i iq s= +  for , ),i h l= the marginal 
consumer in the DC market is determined by * *(1 ) (1 ) .h h l ls p s p 
 + − = + − Solving for the 
critical value of * , we have 
* * *( ) [ ( )],h l h lp p s s = − −  where 
*1 0   for * * 0h lp p   and 
0.h ls s  It follows that demands for the low- and high-quality products in the DC market are: 
* *
* * * *( , )
( )
h l
l h l
h l
p p
D p p
s s


−
= =
−
 and 
* *
* * * *( , ) 1 1 .
( )
h l
h h l
h l
p p
D p p
s s


−
= − = −
−
          (5) 
Note that market demand for the low-quality product, * * *( , ),l h lD p p defines the DC import. 
Based on the framework of trade in quality-differentiated products, our next step of the 
analysis is to identify conditions under which dumping arises. We then analyze and compare 
equilibrium outcomes under three policy options, which are: free trade, trade damage measure of 
imposing an antidumping duty, and a price undertaking. We begin with the case of free trade.  
 
2.2.2Free trade (under which dumping takes place) 
Under free trade (FT), we use a two-stage game to characterize the duopolistic 
competition between DC and LDC firms. At stage one, the firms determine quality-upgrades, FThs
and ,FTls to maximize their respective profits. At stage two, the firms set their profit-maximizing 
prices, *, hFT FThp p and  *, ,lFT FTlp p  respectively, in the DC and LDC markets by engaging in 
Bertrand competition. Using backward induction, we derive the sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium for the two-stage game. 
At the second stage of the game, the DC and LDC firms respectively solve their profit 
maximization problems as follows:  
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 *
* * * 2
,
1
Max  ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ,
2FT FTh h
FT FT FT FT FT FT FT FT FT FT
DC h h h l h h h l h h
p p
p D p p p D p p s = + −  
 
 *
* * * 2
,
1
Max  ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ,
2FT FTl l
FT FT FT FT FT FT FT FT FT
LDC l l h l l l h l l l
p p
p D p p p D p p s = + −           (6) 
where FThD  and 
FT
lD  are given in (3) while 
*FT
hD  and 
*FT
lD are given in (5).The first-order 
conditions (FOCs) for the firms imply that the optimal prices of the high- and low-quality 
products in the DC market are: 
* 2 ( )
3
FT FT
h lFT
h
s s
p
 −
=  and *
( )
,
3
FT FT
h lFT
l
s s
p
 −
=           (7) 
and those of the high- and low-quality products in the LDC market are: 
2( )
3
FT FT
h lFT
h
s s
p
−
=  and 
( )
,
3
FT FT
h lFT
l
s s
p
−
=           (8) 
The prices of the products, as shown in (7) and (8), permit one to investigate whether any 
firm sells a product in the foreign market at a price lower than the product's price in its domestic 
market. In this case, dumping arises.  
We first compare FThp
  and ,FThp the prices of the high-quality product in the DC and LDC 
markets. It follows from (7)-(8) that 
2 ( )
3
1
2( )
3
FT FT
h l
FT
h
FT FTFT
h lh
s s
p
s sp



− 
 
 = = 
− 
 
 
,            (9) 
which implies that .FT FTh hp p
         
The result in (9) indicates that, in equilibrium, the price of the high-quality product is 
higher in the LDC market than in the DC market. The DC firm finds it profitable not to practice 
dumping in the LDC market.  
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Next, we compare FTlp
  and ,FTlp  the prices of the low-quality product in the DC and 
LDC markets. It follows from (7)-(8) that 
( )
3
1,
( )
3
FT FT
h l
FT
l
FT FTFT
h ll
s s
p
s sp



− 
 
 = = 
− 
 
 
 
which implies that ( ) .FT FT FTl l lp p p
 =            (10) 
The result in (10) indicates that the price of the low-quality product is lower in the DC 
market than in the LDC market. Based on the WTO/GATT guidelines, dumping arises! The LDC 
firm, a low-quality producer, takes advantage of free trade and wallows in trade abuse activity of 
practicing dumping in the DC market under this regime. 
 Substituting the product prices from (7)-(8) back into (3) and (5), we have the 
equilibrium demands (i.e., market shares) of the high- and low-quality products in the DC and 
LDC markets: 
 
2
,
3
FT
hD
 =
1
;
3
FT
lD
 =
2
3
FT
hD =  and  
1
.
3
FT
lD =            (11) 
At the second stage of the game, the DC and LDC firms determine their quality-upgrades,
 , .FT FTh ls s  To find the solution, we first plug the products' prices from (7)-(8) and their demands 
from (11) back into the firms' profit functions in (6). The FOCs for the firms imply that  
4(1 )
0
9
FT
h
h
s


+
=  and 0.
FT
ls =              (12a) 
It follows that R&D expenditures on quality improvements by the DC and LDC firms are:  
2
21 8(1 )( ) 0
2 81
FT FT
h h h
h
E s



+
= =  and
21 ( ) 0.
2
FT FT
l l lE s= =        (12b) 
These results lead to the first corollary: 
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COROLLARY 1. In the vertical product differentiation model of competition between a 
DC and an LDC under free trade, the DC firm (a high-quality producer) has an economic 
incentive to invest in R&D activities for quality improvements. Nevertheless, the LDC firm (a 
low-quality producer) has no economic incentives to undertake quality upgradation. 
By substituting FThs  and 
FT
ls from (11) back into (7)-(8), we calculate the equilibrium 
prices of the high- and low-quality products in the DC and LDC markets: 
8 (1 )
,
27
FT
h
h
p
 

 +=
4 (1 )
;
27
FT
l
h
p
 

 +=
8(1 )
27
FT
h
h
p


+
= ,
4(1 )
.
27
FT
l
h
p


+
=         (13) 
Making use of the demands in (11), the prices in (13), and the profit function in (6), we calculate 
total profit for the DC firm: 
 
28(1 )
.
81
FT
DC
h


+
 =             (14a) 
 The surplus of DC consumers is: ,FT FT FTDC l hCS CS CS= +  where l
FTCS and FThCS represent 
benefits to consumers in DC from buying the low- and high-quality products. That is,  
*
*
1 *
 in DC  in DC
[ (1 ) ] ( ) [ (1 ) ] ( ).
FT
FT
FT FT
l h
aFT FT FT FT FT FT FT
DC l l h ha
CS CS
CS s p dF s p dF


    
+ = + − + + −   (14b) 
By substituting the equilibrium demands, prices, and quality-upgrades from (7)-(8) and (11)-(13) 
into (14b), we have  
 
[(81 8 8) (48 48 162 36 36 )]
.
162
h hFT
DC
h
a a a
CS
     

− − + + + + +
=      (14c) 
Defining DC's social welfare as ,FT FT FTDC DC DCSW CS= + we substitute 
FT
DCCS  and 
FT
DC  from (14a) and 
(14c) into the welfare expression. This yields  
2 2 2(24 81 8 16) (48 48 162 36 36 )
.
162
h hFT
DC
h
a a a
SW
       

+ + + + + + + +
=    (14d) 
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Turning to LDC, we compute total profit for the LDC firm by plugging the equilibrium demands, 
prices, and quality-upgrades from (7)-(8) and (11)-(13) back into (6). This yields 
 
24(1 )
.
81
FT
LDC
h



+
=            (15a) 
The surplus of LDC consumers is: ,FT FT FTLDC l hCS CS CS= + where l
FTCS and h
FTCS represent economic 
benefits to consumers in LDC from buying the low- and high-quality products. That is,  
 
ˆ 1
ˆ
 in LDC  in LDC
[ (1 ) ] ( ) [ (1 ) ] ( ).
FT
FT
FT FT
l h
aFT FT FT FT FT FT FT
LDC l l h ha
CS CS
CS s p dF s p dF


   
+
= + − + + −        (15b) 
Making use of the equilibrium demands, prices, and quality-upgrades in (7)-(8) and (11)-(13), we 
follow (15b) to calculate the LDC's consumer surplus. This yields  
(81 8 8) (48 48 162 36 36 )
.
162
h hFT
LDC
h
a a a
CS
    

− − + + + + +
=         (15c) 
The LDC's social welfare is: ,FT FT FTLDC LDC LDCSW CS = +  where 
FT
LDCCS  and 
FT
LDC  are given by 
(15a) and (15c).  It is easy to verify that  
2(8 81 8 ) (48 48 162 36 36 )
.
162
h hFT
LDC
h
a a a
SW
     

+ + + + + + +
=       (15d) 
The results of the above analyses permit us to establish the first proposition: 
PROPOSITION 1. In the two-way free trade where DC firm produces a high-quality product, 
and LDC firm produces a low-quality product, the DC firm does not practice dumping. 
Nevertheless, the LDC firm dumps the low-quality product at a price less than the product's 
price in its local market.  
Proposition 1 has significant implications for the WTO guidelines on identifying the 
circumstances under which dumping arises. Considering trade between DCs and LDCs in "like" 
products with quality differentiation, DC firms manufacturing and selling high-quality products 
do not practice dumping. However, LDC firms manufacturing and selling low-quality products 
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find it profitable to practice dumping. These results help to explain why we frequently observe 
the large-scale dumping of cheap low-quality products by LDC firms in international markets.  
The practice of dumping by LDC firms is a severe problem in the import-competing 
markets of developed countries. Our theoretical prediction is supported by several empirical 
findings showing that DCs had been the target of dumping by exporting firms from LDCs. For 
instance, Prusa (2001) finds that until the 1980s, about 95% of the AD actions are taken by DCs 
against dumping by LDC firms. Neufeld (2001) indicates that the AD duties as a trade remedy 
rose to 42% from 38% as a response to the LDC dumping during the 1994-1999 period. 
Blonigen and Prusa (2016) document that DCs are the largest AD policy users against the 
practice of dumping by firms from LDCs. The empirical findings promote us to examine the next 
case when the DC government imposes an antidumping policy on LDC dumping. 
2.2.3 Antidumping policy 
 We have shown (in Section 2.2) that LDC firm exports a low-quality product and 
practices dumping by setting a price, ,FTlp
 less than the product's price in its local market, .FTlp In 
this section, we analyze the economic effects of antidumping policy.  
In response to the LDC dumping, the DC government imposes an ad valorem duty, 
denoted as t, up to the dumping margin. That is, 
 
,
FT FT
l l
FT
l
p p
t
p
−
=          
which is the price difference between FTlp and 
FT
lp
 as a proportion of the LDC's local price .FTlp  It 
follows from this dumping margin equation that ,FT FT FTl l lp p tp
− = which implies that  
1
.
(1 )
FT FT
l lp p
t
=
−
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This indicates that, through its AD laws, the DC government can elevate the price of the 
low-quality product up to FT
lp , which is the product's free-trade price in the LDC market. In 
terms of notation, we re-define FT
lp  as ,
AD
lp
 that is, * ,FT ADl lp p where 
AD
lp
 stands for the price of 
the low-quality product in the DC market after the ad valorem duty, t, is imposed. We thus have  
* *1( ) ,
1
AD FT
l lp p
t
=
−
 
which implies that  
 * *(1 )FT ADl lp t p= − . 
Given that ADlp
  is set identical to the LDC's local price ,FTlp  the above equation implies that 
* * .AD FT ADl l lp p tp
− =  
Multiply both sides of the above equation by * ,ADlD the quantity of the low-quality 
product imported by DCunder the AD regime, we have the total amount of duty revenue:  
 * * * *( ) .AD FT AD AD ADl l l l lp p D tp D
− =          
Under the AD regime with an ad valorem duty, ,t which remains to be determined by the 
DC government, consumer demands for the low- and high-quality products in the DC market 
will change accordingly. Given the demand equations in (5), we replace the free-trade price, *FTlp
, with *(1 ) .ADlt p− This yields:  
*
* * * (1 )( , ) ;
( )
AD AD
h lAD AD AD AD
l h l
AD AD
h l
p t p
D p p
s s



 − −= =
−
 
*
* * * (1 )( , ) 1 1 ;
( )
AD AD
h lAD AD AD AD
h h l
AD AD
h l
p t p
D p p
s s



 − −= − = −
−
       (16a) 
Whereas demand equations for the low- and high-quality products in the LDC market 
remain unchanged (see equation 16b). That is,  
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ˆ( , ) ;
AD AD
h lAD AD AD AD
l h l
AD AD
h l
p p
D p p
s s

−
= =
−
ˆ( , ) 1 1 .
AD AD
h lAD AD AD AD
h h l
AD AD
h l
p p
D p p
s s

−
= − = −
−
     (16b) 
To characterize the two-market equilibrium solution under the AD regime, we consider a 
three-stage game. At stage one, the DC and LDC firms determine optimal quality-upgrades, ADhs  
and ,ADls  to maximize their respective profits. At stage two, the DC government imposes an 
optimal ad valorem duty on the low-quality product dumped in the DC market. At stage three, 
the competing firms determine profit-maximizing prices for their products in the DC and LDC 
markets by engaging in Bertrand competition. To solve for the sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium, we use backward induction.  
At the third and last stage of the game, the DC and LDC firms set their product prices by 
solving the following profit maximization problems: 
 
* * 2
, 
1
Max  ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ,
2AD ADh h
AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD
DC h h h l h h h l h h
p p
p D p p p D p p s

  = + −  
 
 
* * 2
, 
1
Max  ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ,
2AD ADl l
AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD
LDC l l h l l l h l l l
p p
p D p p p D p p s 

 = + −      (16c) 
where demands ADhD , 
AD
hD
 , ADlD , and 
AD
lD
  are given in (16a)-(16b). The FOCs for the firms 
imply that the optimal prices of their products in the DC and LDC markets are: 
2 ( )
,
3
AD AD
h lAD
h
s s
p
 −=
( )
,
3(1 )
AD AD
h lAD
l
s s
p
t
 −=
−
2( )
,
3
h
AD AD
h lAD s sp
−
=
( )
.
3
l
AD AD
h lAD s sp
−
=   (17a) 
Substituting the prices from (17a) back into (16a)-(16b) yields product demands (or market 
shares) in DC and LDC: 
 * 2 1 ,
3 3
AD AD
l
t
D
t

−
= =
−
* 21 ,
3(1 )
AD AD
h
t
D
t
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−
= − =
−
1ˆ ,
3
l
AD ADD = =
2ˆ1 .
3
h
AD ADD = − =  (17b) 
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A comparison between AD
lp
  and 
l
ADp  in (17a), which are the prices of the low-quality 
product sold in the DC and LDC markets, respectively, allows one to see the impact of the AD 
policy. That is,  
1l
AD
l
AD
p
p t

=
−
 implies that ( ).
1
l
l
AD
AD FT FT
l l
p
p p p
t

 
 
=  = 
− 
       (17c) 
The imposition of an ad valorem duty, ,t raises the price of the low-quality product, 
compared to the product's price under free trade. The result in (17c) thus indicates that the AD 
policy of imposing duties on foreign dumping is effective in promoting "fair" price competition. 
At the second stage of the game, the DC government determines an optimal ad valorem 
duty that maximizes its overall welfare, ( ) ,AD AD AD AD AD ADDC l h DC l lSW CS CS tp D
 = + + +  which is the 
sum of consumer surplus (from purchasing the two products), firm profit (net of R&D cost), and 
duty revenue. That is, the DC government solves the following welfare maximization problem: 
 
*
*
1* *
0
CS  in DC CS  in DC
2
 
Max [ (1 ) ] ( ) [ (1 ) ] ( )
1
                    [ ( ) ]
2
AD
AD
AD AD
l h
AD
DC
AD AD AD AD AD AD AD
DC l l h h
t
AD AD AD AD AD
h h h h h h
SW s p dF s p dF
p D p D s


    

 
 

= + − + + − 
+ + − +
Duty Revenue 
,AD ADl ltp D
 
      (17d) 
where the prices and demands are given in (17a)-(17b). Note that duty revenue in the last term of 
the welfare function is: * * * * *( ) .AD AD AD FT ADl l l l ltp D p p D= −  The DC government's FOC implies that its 
optimal AD duty is:23 
2
.
3
AD at
a
+
=
+
             (17e) 
Substituting ADt from (17e) back into (17a)-(17b), we calculate the equilibrium prices and 
demands in the DC market: 
 
23 See Appendix A-1 for a detailed derivation of the optimal AD duty.  
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2 ( )
,
3
h lAD
h
s s
p
 −= ( ),ADl h lp s s
 = − * 0,AD ADlD 
 = = and
*1 1.ADhD 
 = − =      (17f) 
At the first stage of the three-stage game, the DC and LDC firms decide on their quality-
upgrades. The LDC firm determines an optimal level ADls to maximize its profits.  It follows from 
AD
LDC  in (16c), where prices and demands are given in (17a), (17b), and (17f), that we have 
1 1
0,
9 9
AD
LDC AD AD
l l l l
AD
l
s s
s

 

= − − = − 

        
which implies there is a corner solution:  
0.ADls =             (18a) 
Quality upgradation is thus economically unattractive to the LDC firm since its R&D 
expenditure is zero 2( ( ) 2 0).l
AD AD
l lE s= =  This result is consistent with the observations that 
low-quality product firms in LDCs may have no incentives to undertake costly R&D for quality 
improvements. 
The DC firm decides on an optimal quality-upgrade hs that maximizes its profits. 
Substituting the prices and demands from (17f) back into (16c), we have the profit maximization 
problem of the DC firm: 
 
22( )(3 2) 1Max ( ) .
9 2ADh
AD AD
h lAD AD
LDC h h
s
s s
s


− +
 = −         (18b) 
The FOC for the DC firm implies that its optimal quality-upgrade is: 
2(3 2)
0.
9
AD
h
h
s


+
=              (18c) 
Following from (18c), the DC firm's optimal R&D expenditure on quality improvement is: 
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
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 Substituting 
AD
hs  and 
AD
ls from (18a)-(18c) back into (17f), we obtain the equilibrium 
prices and demands of the high- and low-quality products in the DC market: 
4 (3 2)
,
27
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h
h
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 
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2 (3 2)
,
9
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l
h
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 
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*1 1,AD ADhD 
 = − =
* 0.AD ADlD 
 = =      (18e) 
Similarly, substituting 
AD
hs  and 
AD
ls from (18a)-(18c) back into (17a)-(17b), we have the 
equilibrium prices and demands of the high- and low-quality products in the LDC market: 
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27
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+
=
2(3 2)
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AD AD
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3
l
AD ADD = =     (18f) 
The final step of the analysis is to calculate profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare 
under the AD regime. First, substituting (18f) back into (16c) yields the DC firm's profit: 
22(3 2)
.
81
AD
DC
h


+
 =            (19a) 
The surplus of DC consumers is: ,AD AD ADDC l hCS CS CS= + that is,   
*
*
1* *
CS CS
[ (1 ) ] ( ) [ (1 ) ] ( ).
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CS s p dF s p dF
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
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+ = + − + + −       (19b) 
By plugging the equilibrium prices, demands, and quality-upgrades from (18c)-(18f) into (19b), 
we have the DC's consumer surplus: 
[(27 6 4) (32 48 54 36 54 )]
54
h hAD
DC
h
a a a
CS
     

− − + + + + +
= .     (19c) 
The DC's social welfare is: ,AD AD AD AD AD ADDC DC DC l lSW CS t p D
 = + + where the terms on the RHS of the 
equation are given in(17e), (18e), and (19a)-(19c). After calculating, we have: 
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We turn to the LDC case for determining firm profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare. 
Plugging prices and demands from (18a) and (18f) back into (16c) yields 
6 4
.
81
AD
LDC
h


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+
=             (20a) 
The surplus of LDC consumers is: ,l h
AD AD AD
LDCCS CS CS= +  that is,  
ˆ 1
ˆ0
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Substituting the equilibrium prices, demands, and quality-upgrade from (18a)-(18f) into the 
above expression yields   
(81 12 8) (48 72 162 36 54 )
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The LDC's social welfare is: ( ),AD AD AD AD AD ADLDC LDC LDC l lSW CS t p D
 = + − where the terms on the 
RHS of the equation are given in (17e)-(17f) and (20a)-(20b). After calculating, we have  
27 (16 24 54 12 18 )
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The results in (17f), which show that 
* 0AD ADlD 
 = =  and *1 1,AD ADhD 
 = − =  have interesting and 
important implications for the AD policy as summarized in the following proposition:  
PROPOSITION 2. In the model of trade in quality-differentiated products where the LDC firm 
practices dumping, the imposition of an optimal AD duty by the DC government causes the 
dumper to leave the DC market
*( . .,  0).ADli e D =  
Several studies analyzing the impact of antidumping duty through partial and general 
equilibrium approaches suggest that AD duties remarkably reduce imports (e.g., Murray and 
Rousslang 1989; Gallaway et al. 1999; Bloneign 2016; Besedeš and  Prusa 2017). Particularly, 
Besedeš and Prusa (2017) empirically investigate how AD duties affect US imports in terms of 
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the timings of antidumping actions. This study finds that firms negatively affected by AD 
investigations tend not to return to the market even after the AD order is no longer in effect. 
Besedeš and Prusa (2017) further remark that AD actions are likely to “cause exporters to 
abandon the US market.”Proposition 2 is consistent with the empirical observation that market 
demand for a dumped product is likely to be zero
*( 0)ADlD =  under the AD regime.24 
2.2.4 Price undertaking 
 
When an LDC firm's low-quality product is placed on antidumping order because it 
dumps the product at a price less than that in its local market, the firm may consider the option of 
accepting a price undertaking (PU). This option serves as a business strategy for a foreign 
dumping firm to evade its payment of an AD fine. In this section, we analyze the economic 
effects of a price undertaking regime under which an LDC firm sets its product price identical to 
that in the firm's local market. 
Within the two-market framework of trade, the LDC firm agrees to set PUlp  identical to 
PU
lp
 when making its profit maximization decision (see equation 3). As such, demands for the 
high- and low-quality products in the DC and LDC markets become the following: 
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  (21) 
We solve the price undertaking regime as a two-stage game. At stage one, the DC and 
LDC firms determine their optimal quality-upgrades,  , .PU PUh ls s  At stage two, the firms set their 
product prices in both the DC and LDC markets by engaging in Bertrand competition.  
 
24Prusa (1997) indicates that AD duty reduces the imports from the targeted country, but increases total imports 
through trade diversion. Also, Choi (2017) empirically test the impact of AD duties on imports by focusing on the 
United States, the European Union, China, and India from 1996 to 2015. The findings demonstrate that AD duties 
reduce imports in the short term, while such a relationship disappears in the long run and becomes positive. 
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Starting at the second stage of the game, the DC firm's profit maximization problem is: 
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* 2
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DC h h h h h
p p
p D p D s = + −         (22a)  
where 
h
PUD and 
PU
hD
  are given in (21). The LDC firm's profit maximization problem is: 
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where
l
PUD and 
PU
lD
  are given in (21). Using (22a)-(22b), we derive FOCs for the firms and solve 
for the optimal product prices in both the DC and LDC markets. This yields  
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Substituting the prices from (22c) back into (21), we calculate demands for the high- and low-
quality products in the DC and the LDC markets: 
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At the first stage of the game, the DC and LDC firms determine their optimal quality-
upgrades,  , .PU PUh ls s Plugging the prices and demands from (22c)-(22d) back into the profit 
functions in (22a)-(22b), we have the profit maximization problems for the DC and LDC firms: 
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Using (23a), we derive FOCs for the firms and solve for their optimal quality-upgrades: 
246 9 9
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and 0.l
PUs =             (23b) 
Substituting h
PUs and l
PUs from (23b) back into (22c)-(22d), we calculate the equilibrium prices 
and demands of the high- and low-quality products in the DC market: 
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as well as those of the high- and low-quality products in the LDC market: 
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Note that under a price undertaking, we have * .l l
PU PUp p=  
A comparison of equilibrium demands for the two products in the DC market reveals that 
0FT PU ADl l lD D D
    =  and 0.AD PU FTh h hD D D
            (23e) 
We thus have 
PROPOSITION 3. Unlike the optimal AD policy that causes an LDC dumper to leave the DC 
market, a price-undertaking allows the LDC firm to have a positive market share in the DC 
market.25 The DC firm's market share is higher under a price-undertaking than under free trade 
(with the presence of LDC dumping). 
Having determined the equilibrium prices and demands, we calculate profits, consumer 
surplus, and social welfare. First, making use of the prices in (23c), the demands in (23d), and 
the profit function in (22a), we calculate the DC firm's total profit: 
2 2
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The surplus of DC consumers is: .l h
PU PU PU
DCCS CS CS= + That is,  
 
25This finding is supported by the study of Konings et al. (1998) that price undertaking helps foreign firms to 
maintain their market shares in importing countries. 
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Substituting the prices and demands from (23c)-(23d) into (24b), after re-arranging terms, yields 
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The DC's social welfare is: ,PU PU PUDC DC DCSW CS= +  where 
PU
h is in (24a) and 
PU
DCCS is in  (24c). It 
follows that  
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As for the LDC, we first calculate total profit for the LDC firm by using the equilibrium 
prices and demands in (23c)-(23d). This yields  
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The surplus of LDC consumers is: .l h
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Substituting the results from (23c)-(23d) into (25b), after rearranging terms, we have:
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The LDC's social welfare is: ,PU PU PULDC LDC LDCSW CS = +  where 
PU
LDC  and 
PU
LDCCS are given in (25a) and 
(25c). It follows that 
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Having derived the equilibrium outcomes of the three different trade regimes, our next step of 
the analysis is to see how the regimes affect DC and LDC differently.  
2.3. Regime Comparisons and Policy Recommendations 
 In this section, we compare various effects on R&D investments and the product quality 
decisions by the competing DC and LDC firms across the trade regimes. We then compare the 
resulting effects on firm profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare of the trading nations (i.e., 
DC vs. DC). 
2.3.1 Effects on DC26   
In terms of quality-upgrades chosen by the DC and LDC firms and the quality levels of 
their products, we have from the results in (11), (18c), and (23b) that  
AD FT PU
DC DC DCs s s    which implies that .
AD FT PU
DC DC DCq q q   
 
26 See Appendix A-2 for detailed derivations of the results in this section. 
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We thus have: 
PROPOSITION 4. In the model of trade in quality-differentiated products between a DC and 
an LDC, the optimal quality-upgrade through costly R&D investment is the highest for the DC 
firm when its government imposes AD duties, but is the lowest when the LDC firm accepts a 
price-undertaking. 
 Proposition 4 suggests that product quality optimally chosen by a DC firm 
depends crucially on the type of trade policies that its government implements. Our finding that 
price undertaking reduces the incentive of a DC firm for quality improvement is consistent with 
the study of Vandenbuscche and Wauthy(2001). The authors investigate how the European 
Union's antidumping measures affect the product quality choices of firms and find, among other 
things, that price undertaking affects product quality negatively in the domestic industries of an 
importing-competing country.  
Next, we compare the DC firm's profits. It follows from the results in (14a), (19a), and 
(24a) that 
.AD FT PUDC DC DC      
This ranking of profits leads to the following proposition:  
PROPOSITION 5. DC firm's profit is highest when its government imposes AD duties. 
However, the DC firm's profit is the lowest when the LDC firm accepts a price-undertaking. 
Proposition 5 suggests that DC firms that produce high-quality products have a strong 
incentive to lobby their government to impose AD duties on the dumping of low-quality products 
by LDC firms. This finding lends strong support to several empirical studies documenting that 
AD duty increases domestic profits (Morkre and Kelly 1999; DeVault 1996; Bloneign 2016).  
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To see how DC consumers are affected by LDC dumping, we look at the results in (14c), 
(19c), and (24c).  Comparing the surplus of DC consumers across the three trade regimes yields  
.AD FT PUDC DC DCCS CS CS   
This ranking has interesting policy implications, as summarized in the following 
proposition: 
PROPOSITION 6. DC consumers enjoy the highest surplus when their government imposes 
duties against dumping, as compared to the other two trade regimes. Nevertheless, DC 
consumers are hurt the most when the LDC firm accepts a price-undertaking. 
Proposition 6 suggests that, relative to free trade equilibrium in which foreign dumping of 
low-quality products takes place, DC consumers are better off by purchasing more high-quality 
products under an AD policy. This finding appears to be consistent with the findings of empirical 
studies (see, e.g., Devault, 1996).  
To see the welfare implications of the three different regimes for DC, we look at the 
equilibrium levels of social welfare, as shown in (14d), (19d), and (25d). It follows that    
.AD FT PUDC DC DCSW SW SW   
We thus can state the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 7. DC's social welfare is the highest when its government implements an AD 
policy, but is the lowest when the LDC firm accepts a price-undertaking. 
Proposition 7 is consistent with that study of Pauwels and Springael (2002) that compares 
differences in welfare implications between the European AD policy and a price-undertaking. 
The authors contend that, from the welfare-enhancing perspective, the European Union is better 
off with an AD policy rather than accepting a price undertaking. Moreover, this result holds, 
regardless of whether there is Bertrand or Cornout competition.  
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The acceptance of price undertakings by foreign firms as a settlement strategy plays a 
vital role in affecting the termination of antidumping cases in the European Economic 
Community (EEC). Member countries of the EEC frequently allow foreign firms to accept price 
undertakings, but the number of price undertakings accepted has varied considerably over time. 
Tharakan (1991) indicates that, out of 249 affirmative case decisions for the period 1980–1987, 
as high as 72% were terminated by the acceptance of undertakings in the EEC.Zanardi (2006) 
remark that out of 578 affirmative AD actions for the EEC between 1981 and 2001, as high as 
40.6% of these cases were terminated by price undertakings.However, for the period from 1995 
to 2008, Rovegno and Vandenbussche (2011) demonstrate that the use of price undertakings in 
the European Union has decreased steadily in favor of imposing AD duties. 
2.3.2 Effects on LDC27   
We now examine how the different trade regimes affect the profits of the LDC firm that 
sells a low-quality product. Following the results in (15a), (20a), and (25a), we have 
PU AD
LDC LDC    when  
ˆ
LDC
   and AD PULDC LDC    when  
ˆ ,
LDC
   
where ˆ
LDC
  is the critical value of the inter-country income differential that makes the LDC firm 
indifferent between the AD regime and a price undertaking. The comparison between FTLDC  and 
AD
LDC  (or )
PU
LDC  is straightforward: 
 and FT AD FT PULDC LDC LDC LDC     . 
Taking together the rankings of firm profits, as shown above, we have two possibilities.  
Case 1: When  ˆ
LDC
   (i.e., when income differential is smaller such that the DC and LDC 
markets are more competitive), we have  
 
27 See Appendix A-2 for detailed derivations of the results in this section. 
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,FT PU ADLDC LDC LDC     
where ADLDC  is the LDC's firm profit from its domestic market (due to zero market share in DC). 
Case 2: When ˆ
LDC
   (i.e., when income differential is more substantial such that the DC and 
LDC markets are less competitive), we have  
.FT AD PULDC LDC LDC     
It is easy to verify that PULDC in Case 2 is lower than that in Case 1. We, thus, have 
PROPOSITION 8. LDC's firm profit is the highest by dumping its low-quality product into the 
DC market under free trade, regardless of the degree of competition between the DC and LDC 
markets. However, the comparison between an AD policy and a price-undertaking depends on 
the degree of international market competition. When the DC and LDC markets are more (less) 
competitive, the LDC firm's profit is higher (lower) under a price-undertaking than under an AD 
policy. 
As for the surplus of LDC consumers under the alternative trade regimes, we compare the 
results in (15c), (20c), and (25c) and find that  
.AD FTLDC LDCCS CS  
However, the comparisons between PULDCCS  and 
FT
LDCCS  (or 
AD
LDCCS ) cannot be determined 
unambiguously. We thus have: 
PROPOSITION 9. LDC consumers are better off when the DC government imposes AD duties 
than when there is free trade. 
The economic intuition is as follows. Under an AD policy, gains in LDC's consumer 
surplus by consuming an imported good with a relatively upgraded quality (resulting from DC's 
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R&D investment in quality enhancement) exceed the losses that consumers encounter in 
consumer surplus through consuming the low-quality product with an increased price. 
To compare the equilibrium levels of social welfare across the trade regimes, we have 
from the results in (15d), (20d), and (25d) that  
.PU FT ADLDC LDC LDCSW SW SW   
This ranking has the following welfare implications:   
PROPOSITION 10. LDC's social welfare is the highest when its exporting firm accepts a price-
undertaking, but is the lowest when the firm practices dumping and pays AD duties.  
Given that price undertaking allows a foreign dumping firm to keep some of the AD 
rents, it comes as no surprise that an LDC's social welfare is higher under price undertaking than 
under the AD regime. This finding is consistent with the results of Gao and Miyagiwa 
(2005).The authors indicate that the price undertaking option is a more friendly protection policy 
toward foreign dumper than the AD policy. 
2.3.3 Effects on global welfare  
 It is instructive to investigate how alternative trade regimes affect the world or global 
welfare, defined by aggregating the social welfare of DC and LDC trading partners. Under free 
trade in the presence of dumping, global welfare is: ,FT FT FTDC LDCGW SW SW= +  where 
FT
DCSW  and 
FT
LDCSW are, respectively, given in (14d) and (15d).  It follows that 
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Under the AD regime, global welfare is: ,AD AD ADDC LDCGW SW SW= +  where 
AD
DCSW  and 
AD
LDCSW are, respectively, given in (19d) and (20d). It follows that   
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Under a price-undertaking, global welfare is: ,PU PU PUDC LDCGW SW SW= +  where 
PU
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and PULDCSW are, respectively, given in (24d) and (25d). It follows that  
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A comparison of global welfare in(26a), (26b), and (26c) reveals that     
 .AD FT PUGW GW GW           
This ranking of global welfare permits us to state the following:   
PROPOSITION 11. In the model of two-way trade between a DC and an LDC in quality-
differentiated products, global welfare is the highest when the DC government imposes an 
optimal AD policy against LDC dumping. However, global welfare is the lowest when the LDC 
firm accepts a price-undertaking. 
From the perspective of global welfare, our two-market equilibrium analysis with the 
endogeneity of product quality by DC and LDC firms implies the Pareto superiority of the AD 
policy on dumping. Further, the result in Proposition 11 is supported by the analysis of 
Anderson, Schmitt, and Thisse(1995) that imposing an AD duty on foreign dumping affects 
global welfare positively.  
Rovegno and Vandenbussche (2011) use data from 1995 to 2008 and find that the use of 
price undertakings in the European Union has decreased steadily in favor of AD duty.Similarly, 
Rovegno and Vandenbussche (2011) find that the average use of AD duties for the same period 
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in the EU is more than 76%. These empirical findings have interesting welfare implications for 
DCs and LDCs taken together. As suggested by the finding of Proposition 11, moving toward the 
use of optimal AD charges on foreign dumping as a trade damage measure is essentially welfare-
improving from the global (i.e., WTO) perspective.  
2.4. Concluding Remarks 
 In this paper, we present a simple model of international trade and competition in quality-
differentiated products between two firms located separately in a DC and an LDC. We show that 
dumping arises when the DC and LDC markets have different degrees of competition (due to 
income differences between the trading nations). Explicitly allowing for the endogenous 
decisions of product quality, we find that the DC firm produces a high-quality product, whereas 
the LDC firm produces a low-quality product. Under free trade, the LDC firm dumps its low-
quality product on the DC market at a price lower than the product's price in its local market. 
This result helps to explain frequent observations concerning the dumping of low-quality and 
cheaper products by LDC firms into DC countries. This suggests that dumping is evidence of 
low product quality. Our analysis demonstrates that although dumping is profitable to exporters 
of low-quality products from an LDC, the country's overall welfare decreases when its exporters 
are charged with AD duties. We further show that an LDC is better off by restraining its 
exporters not to practice dumping, but to accept price undertakings.  
To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is among the few theoretical studies that 
adopt a two-market equilibrium model to characterize the dumping decisions of international 
firms, which export low-quality products from the less-developed world to markets in the 
developed world. From the perspective of DCs with their firms producing high-quality products, 
the use of AD duties is effective in dealing with foreign dumping. An AD policy allows for 
domestic firms to regain their market shares. Moreover, AD protection as a trade remedy policy 
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for a DC improves its overall welfare and is thus socially desirable. The equilibrium analysis 
indicates that such an AD policy improves world welfare. Following the WTO/GATT guidelines 
to identify the price-discriminating behavior of dumping low-quality products, the positive 
welfare effect of using AD duties indicates that such a policy is not a protectionist measure. 
Instead, an AD policy is an effective measure of remedy to unfair trade practices. In the face of 
foreign dumping under free trade, the trade remedy measure of imposing AD duties is Pareto 
optimal from the global trade perspective and hence is fundamentally WTO-consistent.  
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Chapter 3 - Import Tariffs vs. Antidumping Duties: A Comparative 
Analysis with Welfare Implications 
 
3.1. Introduction 
States use various protection measures (e.g., tariffs and antidumping duties) to restrain 
imports or to alleviate trade injury resulting from foreign competition which, in turn, helps to 
maximize their economic interests. To illustrate, the United States and South Africa traded white 
meat and dark meat as chicken eaters in the U.S. prefer white meat and South Africans prefer 
dark meat. In 1999, the South African Board of Tariffs and Trade (BTT) initiated an 
antidumping case against the U.S. exporters for their dumping practices. Later, the BTT decided 
with antidumping (AD) duties ranging from 209% to 357% on chicken exports which 
significantly reduced U.S. chicken exports to South Africa and caused the U.S. poultry exports to 
fell by 80% (Watson 2015).Alternatively, national governments use tariffs as a protection tool. 
For instance, recently the U.S. President Donald Trump imposed import tariffs as high as 25% 
and 10% on steel and aluminum imports from the European Union, Canada, and Mexico. These 
tariffs aim to address dumping along with trade protection by supporting U.S. steel and 
aluminum manufacturers. It comes as no surprise that a national government has protection 
measures when facing problems with imports and the resulting trade damage to domestic 
industries.  
Given import tariffs and AD duties as alternative policy options, the issue is whether one 
policy is preferred over the other. Some researchers contend that imposing safeguard tariffs is a 
better choice than using AD duties. Mankiw and Swagel (2005) contend that the primary 
objective of U.S. antidumping law is to protect domestic firms from predatory pricing and 
provide the firms time to become competitive again. However, the use of AD duties by the U.S. 
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government may not be able to achieve its objective but may instead affect both domestic 
producers and consumers negatively. Mankiw and Swagel (2005) further indicate that the best 
strategy to avoid harm is to reform existing AD law and to promote import tariffs (i.e., safeguard 
tariffs). Nonetheless, the U.S. government shows no interest in AD reforms and opposes any 
proposition of reforms both under the domestic and international law (Watson 2015). From the 
perspective of adopting protection measures by trading nations, however, one observes that 
reliance on import tariffs has shown a declining trend, whereas the use of AD duties has been on 
the rise (especially in developing countries).28 
The above discussions about the choice between a tariff policy and an AD duty in a 
contemporary setting shed light on its significance and make it an important issue to investigate. 
Besides, the politico/economic repercussion motivated us to move beyond the arguments and 
investigate the issue by digging deep down into tariffs vs. AD duties to see which policy yields 
the best outcome in terms of domestic profits, consumer benefits, and social welfare. There is a 
plethora of scholarly work done on import tariffs and AD duties in separate settings that analyzes 
the economic implications of each policy. Starting with AD duty, researchers have theoretically 
and empirically examined this policy choice and came across with mixed findings. For instance, 
Marsh (1998) suggests that AD laws positively affect domestic firms' pursuit of AD protection. 
However, Prussa (2005) indicates that AD duty generates more harm to international trade and 
 
28Prusa (2001) documents that until the 1980sabout 95% of the AD disputes are initiated by DCs against LDCs. 
Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2008) find that the later trend shows that LDCs are also highly involved in AD actions. 
Bown (2011a, b) indicates that AD actions are concentrated across traditional users (DCs) and new AD users 
(LDCs). Bown (2013) remarks that most of the new AD disputes launched by LDCs have targeted imports from 
other LDCs.  
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does not achieve the real purpose of AD laws.29 From a different perspective, researchers query 
the effectiveness of import tariffs as a policy option. For example, Baldwin and Green (1988) 
remark that imposing import tariffs as a protection measure is not of much help to enhance 
domestic output. In contrast, Brander and Spencer (1992) demonstrate the effects of tariffs in 
protecting domestic firms from long-term damage when markets are characterized by imperfect 
competition.30 
It seems that relatively little research has been done to compare differences in welfare 
implications between import tariffs and antidumping duties within a unified framework of trade. 
The study of Dinlersoz and Dogan (2010) is an exception. The authors further indicate the 
difficulties in comparing the alternative protection measures in a consolidated approach. 
Practically, the imposition of a tariff is to maximize import revenue or domestic welfare, while 
the use of an AD duty is to elevate the price of a dumped product, which is lower than that of its 
local price (i.e., dumping margin). To deal with this challenging problem of comparing the two 
policy options, we develop a two-market equilibrium model of trade in quality-differentiated 
products. We first show that dumping arises under free trade when there is an income differential 
between two trading nations (e.g., DC and LDC). We then consider two policy options, tariffs or 
AD duties, and conduct a comparative analysis to demonstrate their differences in economic 
effects and welfare implications. Specifically, our model allows for product quality choices of 
 
29For contributions on examining antidumping issues see, e.g., Lahiri and Sheen (1990), Webb (1992), 
Tharakan(1999), Prusa (2001, 2002), Wooton and Zanardi (2002), Aggarwal (2004), Zanardi (2004), Blonigen 
(2006), Chang and Gayle (2006). 
30For contributions on analyzing on the economic effects of tariffs see, e.g., Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963), 
Bhagwati and Kemp (1969), Leith (1971), Alam (1988), Bond (1990), Blonigen (2002), and Johnson (2013).  
Besides investigating tariffs, scholars have examined tariffs in comparison to quotas. See, e.g., Bhagwati (1968), 
Rodriguez (1974), Pelcovits (1976), Takacs (1978), Cassing and Hillman (1985), Krishna (1987), Rotemberg and 
Saloner (1989), Reitzes (1991), Anderson and Neary (2002), and Anderson (2002). 
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two competing firms located separately in a developed country (DC) and a less-developed 
country (LDC), which are characterized by an income differential or a different degree of market 
competition.31 
We summarize the key findings as follows. First, we show that DC firm produces a high-
quality product and does not practice dumping, whereas the LDC firm produces a low-quality 
product that is “dumped” into the DC market. Second, in the case of imposing an AD policy by 
the DC government for trade remedies, the optimal duty rate is at a level high enough to drive 
the LDC firm out of the DC market. Third, the use of AD duties by the DC government 
encourages its firm to undertake more R&D investment for quality improvement than a tariff 
policy. Fourth, In the case of imposing import tariffs under the protectionist regime, the optimal 
tariff set by the LDC government is higher than that set by the DC government. Fifth, DC's firm 
profit is higher under an AD policy than under a tariff policy. DC's consumer surplus and 
domestic welfare are higher (lower) under an AD policy than under a tariff policy when the 
degree of competition between the DC and LDC markets is sufficiently high (low). As for 
impacts on the LDC, we find that LDC's firm profit is higher when the DC government adopts a 
tariff policy than when it imposes an AD policy. LDC consumers are better off under an AD 
policy than a tariff policy. However, LDC's welfare is higher under a tariff policy than under an 
AD policy.  
In comparing the two policy tools, our model of trade in quality-differentiated products 
has implications for world welfare, defined by aggregating the welfare of both DC and LDC. We 
find that world welfare is higher when the DC government imposes an AD policy on LDC 
 
31 Our analytical framework is fundamentally similar to a North-South trade model where one firm in the North (a 
developed country) competes with one firm in the South (a less developed country) in both the northern and 
southern markets. That is, we use DC-LDC trade and North-South trade interchangeably.  
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dumping than when there is a tariff war, under the condition that the degree of competition 
between the DC and LDC markets is sufficiently high. Otherwise, world welfare is higher under 
a tariff policy than under an AD policy. 
This paper complements the contribution of Dinlersoz and Dogan (2010) in comparing 
the two policy tools in a unified approach. Dinlersoz and Dogan (2010)show, among other 
things, that the choice between an AD duty and a tariff depends on the elasticity of demand for 
imports. The authors find that the government opts for an AD duty when import demand 
elasticity is low since it hurts the foreign firm the most. When import demand elasticity is high, 
the government finds it better off by imposing tariffs. It should be mentioned that the present 
study departs from Dinlersoz and Dogan (2010) in some important aspects. First, Dinlersoz and 
Dogan (2010) adopt an oligopoly framework with firms producing a homogeneous product. We 
employ a vertical differentiation framework to show product quality choices of the competing 
firms before engaging in price competition in international markets. Dinlersoz and Dogan (2010) 
assume that one dominant foreign firm competes with few domestic firms where consumers in 
the domestic market have a choice to consume both domestic and foreign goods; however 
domestic firms are not exporters (i.e., no import-competition in the foreign market). We consider 
duopolistic competition between a DC firm and an LDC firm, and their products are available to 
consumers in both markets through trade. Third, Dinlersoz and Dogan (2010) compare tariffs 
and AD duties by assuming the existence of dumping. We show that dumping arises 
endogenously due to product differentiation and a different degree of competition in DC and 
LDC markets.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a two-
market framework of international trade in final goods with vertical product differentiation to 
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analyze duopolistic competition in DC and LDC markets. Showing that dumping takes place 
under free trade, we then evaluate an antidumping policy and compare it with an import tariff 
policy. In Section 3, we discuss how the different protection policies affect firm profits, 
consumer surplus, and social welfare in DC and LDC differently. Section 4 concludes. 
3.2. The Analytical Framework 
3.2.1 Basic assumptions 
 To develop a unified framework for comparing the two protection measures, we consider 
a two-market equilibrium model of trade in which dumping practice arises endogenously due to 
differences in the degree of market competition between two trading countries. The model allows 
for comparing the prices of a product sold in both the domestic and foreign countries (which are 
treated as DC and LDC, respectively, due to an income differential). In the presence of dumping, 
we analyze and compare equilibrium outcomes between two trade policies: import tariffs and 
anti-dumping (AD) duties. One may wonder why it is necessary to compare tariffs to AD duties 
as a policy choice. The key reason for the policy comparison is due to their inherent differences 
in market price effects and welfare consequences. For instance, the use of tariffs is to enhance 
the revenue or welfare of an importing country, while the use of an AD policy is to eliminate the 
dumping margin through price restoration. Given the differences between the two protection 
measures, once we identify the conditions under which there is dumping under free trade, we 
then investigate how import tariffs and AD duties affect firm profits, consumer surplus, and 
social welfare of DC and LDC. 
We consider an import-export model of international duopoly where firms produce "like" 
products with a quality difference and compete in both DC and LDC markets. The firm located 
in DC, where consumers are relatively more affluent, will be shown to manufacture and export a 
high-quality product. For notational convenience, we denote variables for the DC firm with the 
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subscript “h,” representing that its product quality is high. The firm located in LDC, where 
consumers are relatively less affluent, will be shown to manufacture and export a low-quality 
product. Similarly, for notational convenience, we denote variables for the LDC firm with the 
subscript “l,” representing that its product quality is low. We shall show that an income 
differential between DC and LDC markets has a role in explaining the occurrence of dumping in 
the DC market under free trade. 
3.2.1.1 LDC market 
 
 In the LDC market, consumers are uniformly distributed over a unit line, [0,1],  and 
each consumer purchases one unit of a product, which is taken to be a necessity.32 Let hp  and 
lp  be the prices of the high- and low-quality products sold in the LDC market. Following the 
literature on vertical product differentiation, we specify the indirect utility function of an LDC 
consumer located at point  as follows: 
 if buys the high-quality product at price ;
( )
 if buys the low-quality product at price .
h h h
LDC
l l l
q p p
V
q p p



−
= 
−
         (1) 
where iq  represents the quality level of a product by firm ( , ).i h l=  
Following Chang and Raza (2018), we take into account the endogenous decisions of product 
quality improvement by the firms and assume that 
1 ,i iq s= +                 (2) 
where ( 0)is   denotes “quality-upgrade” resulting from firm 'si R&D investment. This approach 
includes the case when the firms are not interested in quality-upgrades ( 0).h ls s= = The 
 
32That is, we consider the case of a full covered market.  This consideration is consistent with the literature that uses 
a vertical product differentiation framework (see, e.g., Cremer and Thisse, 1994; Crampes and Hollander, 1995; 
Wauthy, 1996; Ecchia and Lambertini, 1997; Andaluz, 2000; Chang and Raza 2018). 
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expression in (2) implies that product quality is normalized to one ( 1)h lq q= =  in the absence of 
quality upgradation. Empirical studies suggest that the strategic choice of product quality by the 
DC firm is relatively higher than that of the LDC firm’s (i.e., 0h lq q  ).33 In other words, the 
result that 0h lq q   is due to their respective quality-upgrade choices (i.e., 0h ls s  ). The 
quality upgrade decisions of the firms are endogenous in our model. As in the R&D investment 
literature, we consider that each firm's quality-upgrading expenditure takes a quadratic form: 
2 2,i i iE s=  where the parameter ( 0)i   denotes the cost-effectiveness of R&D investment by 
firm ( , ).i h l=  
 In the LDC market with consumer heterogeneity in tastes for quality  0,1 , the 
marginal consumer who is indifferent between the high-quality product and the low-quality 
product implies that (1 ) (1 ) .h h l ls p s p + − = + − We calculate the critical value of   as 
ˆ / ,h l h lp p s s = − − where ˆ1 0  for 0h lp p   and 0.h ls s   Demands for the low- and 
high-quality products in the LDC market are then given, respectively, as  
( , )
h l
l h l
h l
p p
D p p
s s
−
=
−
 and ( , ) 1 1 .
h l
h h l
h l
p p
D p p
s s

−
= − = −
−
           (3) 
Here, market demand for the high-quality product, ( , ),h h lD p p  defines the LDC import. 
 3.2.1.2 DC market 
In the DC market, we use the superscript “*” to denote all the related variables. We 
assume that DC consumers are distributed uniformly over a unit line,  * 0,1 ,   with each 
buying one unit of the product, which is a necessity. We represent prices of high- and low-
 
33See, e.g., Amiti and Khandelwal (2013). 
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quality products by *hp  and 
* ,lp , respectively. We use the parameter ,  where (0,1), to reflect 
the degree of an income differential between DC and LDC. The indirect utility function of a 
consumer located at a point  * 0,1   in the DC market is specified as 
* * *
*
* * *
 if consumer buys the high-quality product at ;
( )
 if consumer buys the low-quality product at .
h h h
DC
l l l
q p p
V
q p p



−
= 
−
        (4) 
The incorporation of the parameter   into the preference function in (4) follows directly 
from Tirole (1988) that consumer taste for quality is inversely related to the marginal utility of 
income. That is, other things being equal, the marginal utility of consumption is strictly lower for 
consumers in DC than LDC’s consumers. Given (3) and (4), this implies that 
*
i iq q   for 
* =  and a given level of product quality. The parameter (0,1)  reflects the degree of 
market similarity or dissimilarity between DC and LDC. When the value of   increases and 
approaches 1, the DC and the LDC markets resemble each other in that there is a high degree of 
competition. However, when the value of   decreases and approaches to 0, the two markets 
become increasingly dissimilar with a low degree of competition. We shall show that the degree 
of similarity or dissimilarity ( )  has a crucial role in characterizing the market interaction 
between the DC and LDC firms. 
Given the quality upgradation equations for the competing firms ( 1i iq s= +  for , ),i h l=  
the marginal consumer in the DC market is such that 
* *(1 ) (1 ) .h h l ls p s p 
 + − = + −  The 
critical value of 
* , denoted by * ,  is calculated as * * *( ) [ ( )],h l h lp p s s = − −  noting that 
*1 0   for 
* * 0h lp p   and 0.h ls s  In the DC market, demands for the low- and high-
quality products are then given, respectively, as 
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* *
* * * *( , )
( )
h l
l h l
h l
p p
D p p
s s
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−
= =
−
 and 
* *
* * * *( , ) 1 1 .
( )
h l
h h l
h l
p p
D p p
s s


−
= − = −
−
         (5) 
Here, market demand for the low-quality product, * * *( , ),l h lD p p defines the DC import. 
Based on consumer preferences and demands for the quality-differentiated products, we 
proceed to examine the profit-maximization decisions of the DC and LDC firms for identifying 
the firm type practicing dumping. We then analyze how the dumping equilibrium under free 
trade is affected by each of the trade remedy policies: an AD duty and a tariff.  
3.2.2 Free trade (under which dumping takes place) 
 Under free trade, each country can access the market of a trading partner's duty-free. We 
consider a two-stage game. At stage one, DC and LDC firms choose quality upgrades that 
maximize their respective profits. At stage two, the firms set their profit-maximizing prices in 
both the DC and LDC markets by engaging in Bertrand competition. To derive the sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibrium for the two-stage game, we use backward induction.  
We begin with the second stage of the game at which the firms set their prices in the DC 
and LDC markets by solving the following profit maximization problems:  
 *
* * * 2
,   
1
Max  ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ,
2FT FThh
FT FT FT FT FT FT FT FT FT FT
DC h h h l h h h l h h
p p
p D p p p D p p s = + −         (6a) 
 *
* * * 2
,
1
Max  ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ,
2FT FTl l
FT FT FT FT FT FT FT FT FT
LDC l l h l l l h l l l
p p
p D p p p D p p s = + −         (6b) 
where product demands in the DC and LDC markets,denoted as { ,FThD
 ,FThD ,
FT
lD  and 
*FT
lD }, are 
taken from (3) and (5) with the superscript "FT" representing the case of free trade.The first-
order conditions (FOCs) for the DC and LDC firms imply that their optimal prices are: 
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FT FT
h lFT
h
s s
p
 −
= *
( )
,
3
FT FT
h lFT
l
s s
p
 −
=
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h lFT
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−
=        (6c) 
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The issue of concern is whether any firm sells a product in the foreign market at a price 
lower than the product's price in its domestic market. In this case, dumping arises.  
We first compare FThp
  and ,FThp the equilibrium prices of the high-quality product that the 
DC firm charges in both markets, It follows from (6c) that 
2 ( )
3
1,
2( )
3
FT FT
h l
FT
h
FT FTFT
h lh
s s
p
s sp



− 
 
 = = 
− 
 
 
 
which implies that  
.FT FTh hp p
                (7a) 
The result in (7a) indicates that the equilibrium price of the high-quality product is higher 
in the LDC market than in the DC market. Based on the WTO/GATT guidelines, the DC firm 
does not practice dumping.  
Next, we compare FTlp
  and ,FTlp  the prices of the low-quality product that the LDC firm 
charges in the DC and LDC markets, respectively. It follows from (6c) that 
( )
3
1,
( )
3
FT FT
h l
FT
l
FT FTFT
h ll
s s
p
s sp



− 
 
 = = 
− 
 
 
 
which implies that  
( ) .FT FT FTl l lp p p
 =                (7b) 
The result in (7b) indicates that the price of the low-quality product is lower in the DC 
market than in the LDC market. Based on the WTO/GATT guidelines, dumping arises! The LDC 
firm, a low-quality producer, takes advantage of free trade and wallows in trade abuse activity of 
practicing dumping in the DC market under free trade. 
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To calculate market demands (or shares) of the two products for the DC and LDC firms, 
we substitute prices from (6c) back into (3) and (5) to obtain the following:  
* 2(1 ) ,
3
FT FT
hD 
 = − = *
1
,
3
FT FT
lD 
 = =
2ˆ(1 ) ,
3
FT FT
hD = − = and
1ˆ .
3
FT FT
lD = =       (8) 
At the first stage of the game, the DC and LDC firms determine quality upgrades,
 , ,FT FTh ls s to maximize their respective profits. Substituting demands from (8) back into the 
profit functions in (6a) and (6b), we derive the FOCs for the firms and solve for the optimal 
quality-upgrades. This exercise yields  
4 4
0
9
FT
h
h
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

+
=  and 0.
FT
ls =             (9a) 
It follows from (9a) that R&D expenditures for quality improvements are:   
2
21 8(1 )( )
2 81
FT FT
h h h
h
E s
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
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+
= = and 0.
FT
lE =           (9b) 
These results lead to the first corollary: 
COROLLARY 1. In a two-way free trade between a DC and an LDC we consider, the DC firm 
has an economic incentive to undertake costly R&D investment for product quality 
improvements. As such, the DC firm manufactures and exports a high-quality product. However, 
the LDC firm is not interested in quality upgrades such that it manufactures and exports a low-
quality product. 
To calculate the equilibrium prices set by the DC and LDC firms, we substitute (9a) back 
into the price equations in (6c). This yields  
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Making use of (9a)-(9c), we compute profit, consumer surplus, and welfare of the DC 
market: 
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We further compute profit, consumer surplus, and welfare of the LDC market: 
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The findings of the analyses permit us to establish the first proposition: 
PROPOSITION 1. Under free trade between a DC and an LDC where DC firm produces a 
high-quality product and LDC firm produces a low-quality product, the DC firm chooses not to 
dump. Nevertheless, the LDC firm practices dumping by charging at a lower price for its product 
in the DC market than the product's price in its local market. 
The result Proposition 1 has significant implications in the light of WTO guidelines that 
help us to identify the circumstances under which dumping arises. Under free trade, high-quality 
products are not dumped. Instead, low-quality products are always dumped. These results 
support the empirical studies suggesting that LDC firms dump low-quality products in DC 
markets. For instance, Neufeld (2001) shows that antidumping duties as a trade remedy rose to 
42% from 38% as a response to the LDC dumping during the 1994-1999 period. This finding 
prompts one to examine the response of the DC government and the resulting implications both 
in the domestic and global markets. 
The above analysis suggests that an LDC firm manufacturing and exporting a low-quality 
product has an incentive to practice dumping in the DC market under the free trade scenario. As 
a consequence, the rival DC firm faces economic damage due to dumping on free trade. In 
response to the damage, the DC firm files a petition to its government against the LDC firm’s 
trade abuse (i.e., unfair price) for addressing its concerns. After the legal investigation and 
identification, if the LDC firm is found guilty, then the DC government can opt among various 
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tools (i.e., antidumping duties or import tariffs) to assist the domestic firm. Here, in this paper, 
we investigate the issue concerning which policy tool helps to obtain the defined objective to 
prevail the “fair” price of an imported product in its domestic market. 
3.2.3 Antidumping regime 
We have shown in Section 2.2 that, under free trade, the LDC firm dumps its low-quality 
product in the DC market at a price lower than its local price since FT FTl lp p
   (see equation 9c). 
In response to dumping, the DC government may choose to impose an ad valorem duty, t, up to 
the dumping margin. We consider the case where the government sets the duty rate to be 
identical to the dumping margin. That is,  
*
,
FT FT
l l
FT
l
p p
t
p
−
=           
which is the price difference between FTlp and 
*FT
lp as a proportion of the LDC local price .
FT
lp  It 
follows that * ,FT FT FTl l lp p tp− =  which can be re-written as:   
*1 .
(1 )
FT FT
l lp p
t
=
−
          
This result implies that the DC government can elevate, through its AD laws, the price of 
the low-quality product in the DC market up to the level of FTlp , which is the free-trade price of 
the product in the LDC local market. We thus re-define this price level FTlp  to be ,
AD
lp
 i.e., 
* ,AD FTl lp p= where 
AD
lp
  denotes the price of the low-quality product in the DC market after the 
ad valorem duty, t, is imposed. It follows that   
* *1( )
1
AD FT
l lp p
t
=
−
 
which is equivalent to  
 * *(1 ) .FT ADl lp t p= −  
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Given that * ADlp  is set identical to the LDC local price 
FT
lp  under the AD regime, the equation 
that *FT FT FTl l lp p tp− =  can be re-written as:    
* * * .AD FT ADl l lp p tp− =  
Multiplying both sides of this equation by * ,ADlD  which denotes the quantity of the low-
quality product imported by DC under the AD regime, we have the following expression to 
measure the total amount of duty revenue:  
* * * * *( ) .AD FT AD AD ADl l l l lp p D tp D− =          
Under the AD regime with an ad valorem duty, which remains to be optimally 
determined by the DC government, there is a new set of demand equations for low- and high-
quality products in the DC market. We derive this new set of market demands in DC by 
replacing the free-trade price, *FTlp , in (5) with 
*(1 ) .ADlt p− This yields  
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Whereas demand equations for the low- and high-quality products in the LDC market remain the 
same(see equation 5). That is,  
ˆ( , ) ;
AD AD
h lAD AD AD AD
l h l
AD AD
h l
p p
D p p
s s

−
= =
−
ˆ( , ) 1 1 .
AD AD
h lAD AD AD AD
h h l
AD AD
h l
p p
D p p
s s

−
= − = −
−
     (11b) 
For the two-market equilibrium solution under the AD regime, we consider a three-stage 
game. At stage one, the DC and LDC firms independently and simultaneously determine quality-
upgrades that maximize their respective profits. At stage two, the DC government imposes an 
antidumping duty that maximizes domestic welfare. At stage three, the competing firms 
determine their profit-maximizing prices in the DC and LDC markets by engaging in Bertrand 
competition. To solve for the sub-game Nash equilibrium, we use backward induction. 
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At the third and last stage of the game, the DC and LDC firms compete in setting product 
prices as per the following profit maximization problems: 
 *
* * 2
,  
1
Max  ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ;
2AD ADh h
AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD
DC h h h l h h h l h h
p p
p D p p p D p p s  = + −
 
 
* * 2
, 
1
Max  ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ,
2AD ADl l
AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD
LDC l l h l l l h l l l
p p
p D p p p D p p s 

 = + −
     
(12a) 
where the market demands, ,ADhD
 ,ADhD ,
AD
lD  and 
* ,ADlD are given in (11a) and (11b). The FOCs 
for the firms imply that the prices of the products in the DC and LDC markets are: 
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,
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−
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(12b) 
Substituting the prices from (12b) back into (11) yields demands facing the DC and LDC firms:  
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AD AD
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3
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     (12c) 
To see how the AD policy affects prices of the low-quality products sold in both the DC 
and LDC markets, we have from (12b) that  
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3(1 )
,
( ) 1
3
l
AD AD
h l
AD
l
AD ADAD
h l
s s
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s sp t


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which implies that  
( ) ( ).
1
l
l
AD
AD FT FT
l l
p
p p p
t

 =  =
−
           (12d) 
Imposing the AD duty, based on the dumping margin, raises the price of the low-quality 
product in the DC market. This result implies that the DC government achieves its goal of having 
a “fair price” in the domestic market. 
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At the second stage of the game, the DC government determines an optimal AD duty rate 
that maximizes domestic welfare. This welfare is the sum of consumer surplus (from purchasing 
the high-quality and low-quality products), the DC firm's profit (net of R&D cost), and duty 
revenue under the AD regime. Given the prices and demands in (12b)-(12c), the DC government 
solves the following welfare maximization problem: 
 
*
*
1 * *
0
CS CS
2
 
Max [ (1 ) ] ( ) [ (1 ) ] ( )
( )
                    [ ]
2
AD AD
h l
AD
DC
AD AD AD AD AD AD AD
DC h h l l
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h h h h l l
SW s p dF s p dF
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p D p D tp D


    

 
   

= + − + + − 
+ + − +
Duty Revenue  
The FOC for the government implies that the optimal AD duty rate is: 
2
.
3
ADt =              (13a) 
Substituting 
ADt from (13a) back into (12b)-(12c), we calculate product prices and 
demands in the DC and LDC markets:
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h
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3
l
ADD = =
      
(13b) 
 At the third and last stage of the game, the LDC and DC firms determine their 
quality upgrades that maximize individual profits. Based on the profit maximization problems in 
(12a) where the prices and demands are given in (13b), we derive the FOCs for the firms which 
lead to the following results: 
6 4
0
9
AD
h
h
s


+
=  and 0.
AD
ls =            (13c) 
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This implies that quality improvement is economically unattractive to the LDC firm since 
its R&D expenditure is zero 
2( 2 0).l l
AD
lE s= =  This finding is consistent with the observations 
that low-quality product firms in LDCs may have no incentives to undertake costly R&D for 
quality improvements. On the other hand, the DC firm chooses an optimal quality-upgrade and 
incurs an R&D expenditure for product quality improvement: 
22(3 2)
0.
81
AD
h
h
E


+
=            (13d) 
 Substituting the optimal quality upgrades from (13c) back into (13b), we calculate the 
optimal prices and demands for the DC and LDC firms: 
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3
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 Next, we calculate firm profits, consumer surplus, and welfare of both countries. 
Substituting (13c) and (14) back into (12a) yields the optimal profits for the DC and LDC firms: 
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The consumer surplus measures of the two countries are given, respectively, as: 
*
*
1 * * * *
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CS  in DC CS  in DC
[ (1 ) ] ( ) [ (1 ) ] ( );
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Making use of (13c) and (14), we calculate the equilibrium levels of consumer surplus: 
(27 6 4)
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81 12 8
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− −
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The welfare functions of the DC and the LDC are defined, respectively, as: 
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AD AD AD AD AD AD
DC DC DC l lSW CS t p D
 = + +  and ,AD AD AD AD AD ADLDC LDC LDC l lSW CS t p D
 = + −      (15d) 
 
where ADt  is given in (13a), firm profits are given in (15a), and consumer surplus measures are 
given in (15c).We first calculate the total amount of duty revenues, ,AD AD ADl lt p D
  and then 
substitute all the related terms from (15a)-(15c) into (15d) to obtain the maximum levels of 
welfare for the two countries: 
236 18 81 16
162
hAD
DC
h
SW
  
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+ + +
= and
1
2
AD
LDCSW = .        (15e) 
 It is instructive to note the results in (14) that 
* 0AD ADlD 
 = =  and *1 1.AD ADhD 
 = − =  We 
summarize their economic implications in the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 2. In the two-market equilibrium model of trade where the LDC firm dumps its 
low-quality product in the DC market (at a price below the price of the product in the LDC 
market), the best response of the DC government is to optimally set an AD duty rate such that the 
LDC firm is driven out of the DC market
*( . .,  0).ADli e D =  
 The finding of Proposition 2 is consistent with both theoretical and empirical studies that 
investigate the impact of AD duties. For example, Murray and Rousslang (1989) show 
theoretically that the use of AD duties causes a remarkable reduction in imports. Likewise, 
several empirical studies on the impacts of AD duties on U.S. imports indicate that foreign 
dumping firms are significantly hurt by such policy and are less likely to trade with the United 
States. In addition to that, studies suggest that antidumping duty causes trade diversion, and have 
different consequences (variation occurs in short-term to long-term consequences. (Besedes and 
Prusa 2017; Prusa 1997; Choi 2017). 
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3.2.4 Tariff regime 
 Under a tariff regime, each country imposes an optimal tariff for restraining import from 
its trading partner. We consider a three-stage game. At stage one, DC and LDC firms choose 
optimal quality-upgrades and R&D investments that maximize their respective profits. At stage 
two, the DC government imposes a tariff ( DCt ) on its import of a low-quality product supplied by 
the LDC firm. In the meanwhile, the LDC government levies a tariff ( LDCt ) on its import of a 
high-quality product supplied by the DC firm. At stage three, the competing firms set optimal 
prices for their products sold in both the DC and LDC markets by engaging in Bertrand 
competition. We solve the three-stage game using backward induction. 
 At the third stage of the game, the DC and LDC firms solve the following profit 
maximization problems:  
 *
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,
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where market demands are given by (3)-(5) with a superscript "T" representing variables under 
the tariff regime. The FOCs for the firms imply that the product prices in the DC and LDC 
markets are: 
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Substituting the prices from (16b) back into the demand equations (see equations 3-5) 
yields 
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(16c) 
 At the second stage of the game, the DC and LDC governments independently determine 
their tariffs by solving the following welfare maximization problems:  
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DC DC DC DC l
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SW CS t D= + + and 
{ }
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T T T T
LDC LDC LDC LDC h
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Note that the consumer surplus terms in (16d) are: 
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Making use of (16a)-(16e), we derive the FOCs for the DC and LDC governments and calculate 
the optimal tariffs. This exercise yields 
( )T TDC h lt s s= − and .
T T
LDC h lt s s= −            (16f) 
We then plug the optimal tariffs in (16f)back into (16b)-(16c)to obtain product prices and 
demands for the firms:
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At the first stage of the game, the DC and LDC firms determine quality-upgrades,
 , ,T Th ls s that maximize their respective profits. By substituting the prices and demands from 
(17a) back into the profit functions in (16a), we derive the FOCs for the DC and LDC firms: 
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Solving for the optimal quality-upgrades chosen by the DC and LDC firms yields 
9 1
9
T
h
h
s

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+
= and 0.
T
ls =        
 (17b)Equation (17b) implies that the LDC firm does not have an incentive for quality-
upgrades since its R&D expenditure is zero 2( ( ) 2 0).T Tl l lE s= = This may explain why firms in 
many developing countries show no interest in costly R&D investments for quality enhancement.  
 On the other hand, the DC firm finds it profitable to undertake R&D since 
2 2( ) (9 1)
0.
2 162
T
h hT
h
h
s
ED
 

+
= =            (17c) 
We thus have  
PROPOSITION 3. The imposition of an import tariff by the DC government on the foreign 
dumped product by an LDC firm, which manufactures and exports a low-quality product, does 
not affect the LDC firm's incentive in undertaking R&D investment for product quality 
upgradation. 
The result in Proposition 3 is consistent with several studies that empirically test how 
import tariffs affect quality reversal. For example, Feenstra (1988) investigates imports of 
Japanese compact trucks and finds that there is no sustained quality upgradation despite the 
increased tariffs. In analyzing trade policy and quality upgradation in developing economies, 
Moraga-González and Viaene (2005) find that import tariffs help to reap foreign rents but do not 
help for quality reversal.34 
 
34Lenway, Morck, and Yeung (1996) examine the effect of protectionism on innovation in American Steel Industry. 
Though the study did not specifically focus on the tariffs as a protectionism policy, it does suggest that 
protectionism in steel industry discourage innovation that eventually lead the firms to exit. 
70 
The next step of the analysis is to determine optimum tariffs set by the DC and LDC 
governments. To do so, we substitute the firms' quality-upgrades, { , },T Th ls s from (17b) back into 
(16f). This yields 
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+
= and 
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.
9
T
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

+
=           (17d) 
Since 0 1,  it follows from (17d) that 
 .T TLDC DCt t  
We thus have the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 4: In a tariff game under the protectionist regime, where the DC firm exports a 
high-quality product and the LDC firm exports a low-quality product, the optimal tariff imposed 
by the LDC government is strictly higher than that imposed by the DC government. 
By substituting the optimal quality-upgrades from (17b) back into (17a), we calculate the 
equilibrium prices and demands of the high-quality product in the DC and LDC markets:  
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As for the equilibrium prices and demands of the low-quality product in the DC and LDC 
markets, we have  
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Making use of (17b), (17d), (18a), and (18b), we calculate profits (see equation 16a) for the DC 
and LDC firms: 
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Moreover, we calculate the equilibrium levels of consumer surplus, , ,T TDC LDCCS CS  for DC and 
LDC by substituting (17b) and (18b) into the consumer surplus measures in (16e). This yields 
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To compute welfare for each country, we use the functions in (16d). That is, 
T T T T
DC DC DC DC lSW CS t D
= + + and ,T T T TLDC LDC LDC LDC hSW CS t D= + +  where tariff rates are given in 
(17d), consumer surplus measures are in (18d), and firm profits are in (18d). After calculating 
and rearranging terms, we have  
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3.3. Tariffs vs. AD Duties: Policy Recommendations  
 Having derived the equilibrium outcomes under an AD policy and a tariff policy, we 
proceed to analyze differences in implications between the two policies (in terms of quality 
upgrades, product prices and demands, consumer surplus, firm profits, and social welfare). We 
include free-trade equilibrium results (with the presence of LDC dumping) for references. In 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we look at effects on the trading nations, DC and LDC, respectively. In 
Section 3.3, we discuss differences in implications from the global perspective of welfare.  
 
3.3.1Effects on DC 
We first compare the optimal levels of quality-upgrades and the DC firm's product 
quality under alternative trade regimes. An examination of (9a), (13c), and (17b) reveals that  
AD T FT AD T FT
h h h h h hs s s q q q      if 0.6;   
AD FT T AD FT T
h h h h h hs s s q q q      if 0.6.   
72 
From the results in (9b), (13d), and (17c), it follows that the optimal R&D investments for 
quality improvement by the DC firm are ranked as follows: 
AD T FT
DC DC DC
E E E  if 0.6; 
AD FT T
DC DC DC
E E E    if 0.6.   
We thus have  
PROPOSITION 5.The imposition of an AD policy by the DC government against LDC dumping 
leads the DC firm to invest more for product quality upgradation than a tariff policy. 
Consequently, the DC firm's product quality is relatively higher under the AD policy than under 
the tariff policy. 
As for the price of the high-quality product in the DC market, we have from (9c),(14), 
and (17a) that  
T AD FT
h h hp p p
    if 
1
;
3
  AD T FTh h hp p p
      if
1
.
3
   
Using the results in (8), (14), and (18a), we compare DC's demands for the high-quality product. 
It follows that 
T AD FT
h h h
D D D  =  . 
For comparing the prices of the low-quality product in the DC market, we have from (9c), (14), 
and (18b) that 
.AD T FTl l lp p p
     
As for DC's demands for the low-quality product, we have from (8), (14), and (18b) that  
1
0.
3
FT AD T
l l lD D D
  =  = =  
Next, we look at firm profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare under the two 
protection policies against the LDC dumping under free trade. First, a comparison of the DC 
firm's profits in (15a)and (18c) reveals that 
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.AD TDC DC    
While, comparing profits across the three regimes through (10a),(15a), and (18c) yields 
AD T FT
DC DC DC     if  0.6; 
AD FT T
DC DC DC     if 0.6.   
We thus have the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 6. DC's firm profit is higher when its government implements an AD policy 
than when its government implements a tariff policy. 
This proposition suggests that, compared to imposing import tariffs, imposing AD duties 
by the DC government against dumping benefits domestic industries.  This may explain why the 
use of AD duties continues to be the policy option by DC countries when it comes to protecting 
domestic industries. 
Concerning differences in impacts on consumer benefits, we have from (10a), (15b), and 
(18d) that the ranking of consumer surplus depends on the degree of international market 
competition. That is, 
T FT AD
DC DC DCCS CS CS  if 0.7;   
FT AD T
DC DC DCCS CS CS   if 0.7.   
Finally, we look at differences in implications for social welfare. It follows from (10a) ,(15e), 
and (18e) that 
T AD FT
DC DC DCSW SW SW  if 0.7;   
AD FT T
DC DC DCSW SW SW   if 0.7.   
We thus have: 
PROPOSITION 7. Consumer surplus and overall welfare in DC are higher under an AD policy 
than under a tariff policy when   is critically high (i.e., when the DC-LDC income differential is 
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smaller or when the DC and LDC markets are more similar and competitive). Otherwise, 
consumer surplus and overall welfare are relatively lower under an AD policy. 
The results in Propositions 6 and 7 have interesting policy implications. When the degree 
of competition between DC and LDC markets is sufficiently high, the process for filing an AD 
petition in DC is likely to be relatively easy. The economic reason is that firm profits, consumer 
benefits, and overall welfare (including duty revenue collected by an importing country 
government) in DC are all higher with an AD duty than with a tariff. 
3.3.2 Effects on LDC 
We now turn to the LDC market. The equilibrium prices of the low-quality product 
charged by the LDC firm (see equations 14 and 18b) under the two protection measures indicate 
that 
T AD
l lp p if 
1
;
6
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1
.
6
   
Considering also the product prices under free trade, we have from (9c),(14), and (18b) that  
T AD FT
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;
6
  AD T FTl l lp p p  if
1
.
6
   
With respect to LDC's demands for the low-quality product under the two protection measures, 
we have 
.T ADl lD D  
Considering also the market demands under free trade, we have from (8), (14), and (18b) that  
.T AD FTl l lD D D =  
In contrast, the price of the high-quality product that the DC firm charges in the LDC 
market is higher under a tariff policy than under an Ad policy. That is, 
.T ADh hp p  
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It comes as no surprise that the price of the high-quality product in the LDC market is the lowest 
under free trade.  
.T AD FTh h hp p p   
This ranking comes from comparing the results in (9c), (14), and (18a). 
As for LDC's demands for the high-quality product under the alternative trade regimes, 
we have from (8), (14), and (18b) that 
.FT AD Th h hD D D=   
Next, we look at LDC's firm profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Profits of the 
LDC firm, when the DC government adopts the protection regimes, are recorded in (15a) and 
(18c). It follows that 
 .T ADLDC LDC   
Considering also the LDC firm's profits free trade (see equation 10b), we have: 
 .T FT ADLDC LDC LDC     
These results to the following: 
PROPOSITION 8. LDC's firm profit is higher when the DC government implements a tariff 
policy than when it implements an AD policy. 
Concerning differences in impacts on consumer benefits between the two protection 
measures, we have from (15c) and (18d) that 
.AD TLDC LDCCS CS  
Including the equilibrium level of consumer surplus under free trade (see equation 10b), the 
ranking is: 
.FT AD TLDC LDC LDCCS CS CS   
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To see differences in implications for social welfare between the two protection measures, we 
have from (15e) and (18e) that  
.T ADLDC LDCSW SW  
Including the equilibrium level of social welfare under free trade (see equation 10b), the ranking 
of welfare is: 
.T FT ADLDC LDC LDCSW SW SW   
We, therefore, have  
PROPOSITION 9. LDC consumers are better off under an AD policy than under a tariff policy. 
Nevertheless, LDC's overall welfare is higher under a tariff policy than under an AD policy. 
3.3.3 Implications for global welfare 
Finally, we investigate differences in implications between the two protection measures 
from the perspective of global welfare. To do so, we calculate global welfare, denoted as GW, by 
aggregating the welfare of both DC and LDC under the alternative regimes (i.e.,
j j j
DC LDCGW SW SW= +  for , ,  ).j FT AD T=  
Making use of the results in (10b), (15e) and (18e), we have   
( 1)(16 81 16)
,
162
hFT
h
GW
  

+ + +
=
236 81 18 81 16
,
162
h hAD
h
GW
   

+ + + +
=  
281 108 162 13
.
162
hT
h
GW
  

− + + +
=   
An examination of the equilibrium levels of global welfare reveals that there are two 
possibilities: 
 (i) AD FT TGW GW GW  if 0.8;   
 (ii) T AD FTGW GW GW   if 0.8.   
We thus have  
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PROPOSITION 10.World welfare is higher when the DC government adopts an AD policy 
(against LDC dumping) than when the government adopts a tariff policy, provided that   is 
critically high (i.e., when the DC and LDC markets are similar and competitive).Otherwise, 
world welfare is higher under a tariff policy than under an AD policy. Regardless of the degree 
of international market competition, AD policy is Pareto superior to free trade (under which 
LDC dumping arises). 
3.4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we analyze differences in welfare implications between two protection 
measures: import tariffs and antidumping duties, within a unified model of trade. Our two-
market equilibrium model of trade allows for preference heterogeneity in consumer choices and 
the endogenous decisions of product quality by international duopolistic located in a DC and an 
LDC, respectively. We show that the LDC firm sells a low-quality product that is dumped into 
the DC market. We consider the two policy tools.  In comparing AD duties to import tariffs, we 
find that the former is more likely to drive the LDC firm out from the DC market completely, 
while the latter does not affect the LDC firm's incentive for product quality upgradation. 
Imposing AD duties by the DC government encourages its firm to undertake more R&D 
investment for product quality upgradation than that under import tariffs. This result suggests 
that AD is a better policy option for increasing the domestic firm's product quality. Likewise, 
DC's firm profit is higher, with its government choosing an AD policy over an import tariff 
policy. AS for effects on DC consumers and domestic welfare, both are higher under the AD 
policy than under the tariff policy when the DC-LDC income differential is smaller (i.e., their 
markets are similar). However, it yields opposite results when the DC and LDC markets are 
dissimilar, or the degree of market competition is low.  
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In the context of an LDC firm that produces and exports a low-quality product, its profit 
is higher when an importing country (DC government) imposes tariffs than when there is an AD 
duty. For consumer surplus in the LDC, it is higher with the AD duty than with an import tariff, 
whereas for social welfare the converse is true.  
The two-market equilibrium analysis of trade in quality-differentiated products has 
welfare implications for world trade. We show that world welfare is higher with DC government 
imposing an AD duty against LDC dumping than when there is a tariff policy, when the DC-
LDC income differential is smaller or when the degree of market competition is high. In contrast, 
world welfare is higher under a tariff policy than under an AD policy when the DC-LDC income 
differential is greater or when the degree of market competition is lower. 
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Appendix A - Appendix of Chapter 2 
A-1. The determination of an optimal AD duty 
Under the AD regime, there is a three-stage game. At the third stage where there is price competition, the 
DC and LDC firms determine their product prices by solving the profit maximization problems. The 
FOCs for the DC firm are: 
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Moreover, the FOCs for the LDC firm are: 
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Simultaneously taking into account the four-equation system in (a.1) and (a.2), we solve for the 
equilibrium prices of the high- and low-quality products in the DC and LDC markets as follows: 
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We then calculate market demands for the two products in the DC and LDC markets: 
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To solve for an optimal AD duty set by the DC government, we substitute prices and demands into the 
social welfare function of the DC:  
* * *
Producer surplusConsumer surplus Duty revenue
( ) ,AD AD AD AD AD FT ADDC l h DC l l lSW CS CS p p D= + +  + −  
where the last term measures the total amount of duty revenue. It follows that  
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The FOC for the DC government is:   
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which implies that the optimal AD duty is: 
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A-2 Effects on DC under the alternative trade regimes 
 
(i) The ranking of DC firm's optimal quality-upgrades 
Given that the optimal quality-upgrades under the three different regimes are: 
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We thus have: 
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(ii) The ranking of DC firm's profits 
Given that the optimal profits for the DC firm under the three different regimes are: 
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We thus have: .AD FT PUDC DC DC      
(iii) The ranking of DC's consumer surplus 
Given the equilibrium levels of consumer surplus in (14c), (19c), and (24c), we have 
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a a a
CS CS
    

+ − + + +
− =  
3 2
3
3 2 3 2
3
(1 )(209 973 787 79)
2592 ( 1)
(1 )( 252 252 252 252 444 996 324 228)
 .
2592 ( 1)
FT PU
DC DC
h
h
CS CS
a a a a a
    
 
       
 
−
− + + +
=
+
− − − + + − − − +
+
+
 
To make a comparison, we need to determine restrictions on the parameter a  for utility 
* * *( )DC l lV q p = −  to be strictly positive under any of the trade regimes. Note that 
* [ , 1],a a  +  
where 0.a   The utility of a DC consumer located at point a  is: 
( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 0) 0.DC l l l l l l lV a q p a q p a s p a p   
    = − = − = + − = + −   
Under free trade, *
(4 4)
( ) 0
27
FT
DC l
h
V a a p a
 
 

+
= − = −   which implies that 
4 4
.
27 h
a


+
  
Under AD, *
(6 4)
( ) 0
9
AD
DC l
h
V a a p a
 
 

+
= − = −   which implies  that 
6 4
.
9 h
a


+
  
Under PU, 
2
*
2
(9 46 9)
( ) 0
54 (1 )l
PU
DC
h
V a a p a
  
 
 
+ +
= − = − 
+
 which implies that  
2
2
(9 46 9)
.
54 (1 )h
a
 
 
+ +

+
 
For ( ) 0DCV a   under any of the trade regimes, the constrained condition is: 
6 4
.
9 h
a


+
  We assume 
that this condition holds. Substituting this condition into the expression ( )FT ADDC DCCS CS− , as shown above, 
we find that 0
FT AD
DC DCCS CS−  which implies that .
AD FT
DC DCCS CS  Substituting the constrained condition 
that  (6 4) 9 ha   + into the expression ( ),
FT PU
DC DCCS CS−  we find that .
FT PU
DC DCCS CS  We thus have: 
.AD FT PUDC DC DCCS CS CS   
 
92 
(iv) The ranking of DC's social welfare 
Given the optimal levels of DC welfare under the three regimes in (14d), (19d), and (24d), we have 
(5 6) (24 48 63 36 )
81 81
AD FT
DC DC
h h
a a a
SW SW
    
 
+ + + +
− = + ;
AD FT
DC DCSW SW   
4 3 2
3
4 3 2 4 3 2
3
(1 )(34 427 787 625 175)
2592 ( 1)
(1 )( 252 252 252 252 444 996 324 228 )
  + .
2592 ( 1)
FT PU
DC DC
h
h
SW SW
a a a a a
    
 
        
 
−
− + + + +
=
+
− − − + + − − − +
+
 
Evaluating the above expression under the constrained condition that (6 4) 9 ,ha   +  we find that 
( ) 0FT PUDC DCSW SW−   which implies that .
FT PU
DC DCSW SW We thus have: .
AD FT PU
DC DC DCSW SW SW   
A-3 Effects on DC under the three alternative trade regimes 
(i) The ranking of LDC firm's profits 
Given that maximum profits under the three different regimes are: 
(4 4)( 1)
,
81
FT
LDC
h
 


+ +
=
6 4
,
81
AD
LDC
h



+
= and 
2
2
(9 46 9)
.
81 ( 1)
PU
LDC
h
  

 
+ +
=
+
 
it follows that  
2 (2 1)
0
81
FT AD
LDC LDC
h
 
 

+
− =  ;FT ADLDC LDC    
2 2
2
( 1) (4 15 4)
0
81 ( 1)
FT PU
LDC LDC
h
  
 
 
− + +
− = 
+
;FT PULDC LDC    
3 2
2
3 30 5 4
.
81 ( 1)
PU AD
LDC LDC
h
  
 
 
− − + +
− = −
+
 
We thus have two possibilities:  
(1) 
FT PU AD
LDC LDC LDC    when ˆLDC   (i.e., when income differential is getting smaller) and  
(2) 
FT AD PU
LDC LDC LDC    when ˆLDC   (i.e., when income differential is getting greater).
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(ii) The ranking of LDC's consumer surplus 
Given the equilibrium levels of consumer surplus in (15c), (20b), and (25c), we have 
2(9 12 2)
;
81
FT AD
LDC LDC
h
a a
CS CS


− + −
− =  
4 3 2
3
4 3 2 4 3 2
3
( 15 516 6 828 209)
2592 ( 1)
(540 864 360 288 252 612 600 480 936 444)
;
2592 ( 1)
PU AD
LDC LDC
h
h
CS CS
a a a a a a
   
 
       
 
−
− − + + +
=
+
+ + + + + + + + +
−
+
  
3 2
3
2 3 2 2 2 2 3 2
3
(1 )(79 787 973 209)
2592 ( 1)
(1 )(252 252 252 252 228 324 996 444 )
.
2592 ( 1)
PU FT
LDC LDC
h
h
CS CS
a a a a a a a a
   
 
      
 
−
− + + +
=
+
− + − − + − − −
+
+
 
Evaluating the above expressions under the constrained condition that (6 4) 9 ,ha   + we have, 
( ) 0FT ADLDC LDCCS CS−   which implies that .
AD FT
LDC LDCCS CS  However, the comparison between 
PU
LDCCS  and 
AD
LDCCS  or that between 
PU
LDCCS  and 
FT
LDCCS cannot be determined unambiguously. So, the only unambiguous 
ranking of LDC's consumer surplus is: .AD FTLDC LDCCS CS  
We present an alternative proof for the result that 
AD FT
LDC LDCCS CS in the following. Under free trade, the 
equilibrium prices, demands, and R&D investments in product quality improvement by the DC and LDC 
firms are shown in (11), (12a), and (13). The LDC's consumer surplus under free trade contains two 
components: ,
FT FT FT
LDC l hCS CS CS= + where  
ˆ ˆ ˆ 2 21 ˆ ˆ= [ (1 ) ] ( ) (1 ) (1 ) [( ) ] ( )
2
FT
l l l l l l la a a
CS s p dF s d p d s a p a
  
      + − = + − = + − − −    and 
1 1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 ˆ ˆ[ (1 ) ] ( ) (1 ) (1 ) [( 1) ( ) ] [( 1) ].
2
a a aFT
h h h h h h hCS s p dF s d p d s a p a        
+ + +
= + − = + − = + + − − + −  
 
Plugging the results from (11), (12a), and (13) into the above expressions, we obtain the following:  
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2 2 (3 1)(8 9 27 8)1 1 4( 1) 1(1 0) ( )
2 3 27 3 162
FT h h
l
h h
a a
CS a a
  
 
− − − ++   
= + − − − =  
   
 and  
2 2 1(3 2)(4 12 4 9 )4( 1) 1 1 8( 1) 1(1 ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) .
9 2 3 27 3 54
FT h
h
h h h
a a a a
CS a a
   
  
+ + + ++ +   
= + + − − + − =   
   
 
We thus have the result that  
2 248 8 81 48 162 36 36 8
.
162
FT FT FT h h
LDC l h
h
a a a a a
CS CS CS
    

− + + + + + −
= + =  
Whereas under an AD policy, the optimal duty is shown in (17e), R&D investments in product quality 
improvement by the DC and LDC firms are shown in (18a) and (18c), and the equilibrium prices and 
demands are shown in (17f), (18e), and (18f). The LDC's consumer surplus under the AD policy contains 
two components: ,
AD AD AD
LDC l hCS CS CS= + where 
( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ 2 2
2 2
1 ˆ ˆ[ (1 ) ] ( ) (1 ) 1 ( ) ( );
2
AD
l l l l la a a
CS s p dF s d p d s a p a
  
       = + − = + − = + − − −
     
( )1 1 1 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 ˆ ˆ[ (1 ) ] (1 ) (1 ) ( 1) ( ) [( 1) ].
2
a a aAD
h h h h h h hCS s p dF s d p d s a p a        
+ + +  = + − = + − = + + − − + −
   
 Plugging the equilibrium results under an AD policy into the above expressions, we have: 
2 2 (3 1)(12 9 27 8)1 1 2(3 2) 1(1 0) ( )
2 3 27 3 162
AD h h
l
h h
a a
CS a a
  
 
− − − ++   
== + − − − =  
   
 and  
2 2 (3 2)(4 12 6 9 )2(3 2) 1 1 2(3 2) 1(1 ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) .
9 2 3 27 3 54
AD h h
h
h h h
a a a a
CS a a
   
  
+ + + ++ +   
= + + − − + − =  
   
 
It follows that  
2 248 12 81 72 162 54 36 8
.
162
AD AD AD h h
LDC l h
h
a a a a a
CS CS CS
    

− + + + + + −
= + =  
Next, we look at the difference in surplus that LDC consumers obtain through consuming the high-quality 
product and the low-quality product, separately, between the two alternative regimes. We have:  
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(3 2)(4 12 6 9 ) (3 2)(4 12 4 9 ) (3 2)
54 54 27
AD FT h h h h
h h h
h h h
a a a a a a a a a a
CS CS CS
      
  
+ + + + + + + + +
 = − = − =
which implies that 
AD FT
h hCS CS  and  
( )( )3 1 12 9 27 8 (3 1)(8 9 27 8) 2 (3 1)
162 162 81
h hAD FT h h
l l l
h h h
a a a a a
CS CS CS
      
  
− − − + − − − + −
 = − = − =
 
which suggests that .
AD FT
l lCS CS These results indicate that, under an AD regime, gains in surplus 
( )hCS  to LDC consumers by enjoying the high-quality product with enhanced quality (due to DC firm's 
R&D investment in quality upgradation) exceed the losses in consumer surplus ( )lCS  that LDC 
consumers encounter when consuming the low-quality product at an increased price. Thus, compared to 
the result under free trade, LDC's consumer surplus is higher under an AD policy than under free trade. 
(iv) The ranking of LDC's social welfare 
Given the optimal levels of LDC welfare under the three regimes in (15d), (20c), and (25d), we have:
 
(4 4) (9 12)
;
81 81
FT AD
LDC LDC
h h
a a
SW SW
  
 
+ +
− = −  
 
4 3 2
3
3 2 3 2
3
(1 )(128 559 787 293 81)
2592 ( 1)
(1 )(252 252 252 252 228 324 996 444)
 .
2592 ( 1)
PU FT
LDC LDC
h
h
SW SW
a a a a a
    
 
      
 
−
− + + + +
=
+
− + − − + − − −
+
+
 
Evaluating the above expressions for (6 4) 9 ,ha   +  we find that 0
FT PU
LDC LDCSW SW−   and 
0.PU FTLDC LDCSW SW−    It follows that .
PU FT AD
LDC LDC LDCSW SW SW   
(v) The ranking of global welfare 
Given the optimal levels of global welfare as shown in(26a), (26b), and (26c), we have: 
2 2(36 48 63 45 2)
0;
81
AD FT
h
a a a a
GW GW
   

+ + + + +
− =   
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2 2
2
2 2 2
2
(1 ) (47 66 47)
1296 (1 )
(1 ) (126 252 126 222 612 222)
                          0.
1296 (1 )
FT PU
h
h
GW GW
a a a a
  
 
    
 
− + +
− =
+
− + + + + +
+ 
+
 
It follows that .AD FT PUGW GW GW   
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Appendix B - Appendix of Chapter 3 
A-1. The determination of an optimal AD duty 
Under the antidumping policy, we consider a three-stage game and solve for the sub-game Nash 
equilibrium using backward induction. At stage three, DC and LDC firms determine the optimal prices of 
their products in the DC and LDC markets by engaging in Bertrand competition. The FOCs for the DC 
firm are:  
* * *(2 ) 0,
AD
DC AD AD AD AD AD
h l l h l
AD
h
p p tp s s
p
 


= − + − + =

2 0,
AD
DC AD AD AD AD
l h h l
AD
h
p p s s
p

= − + − =

 
and the FOCs for the LDC firm are: 
* * *
*
( 2 2 ) 0,
AD
LDC AD AD AD
h l l
AD
l
p p tp
p

= − + =

2
0.
AD AD AD
LDC h l
AD AD AD
l h l
p p
p s s
 −
= =
 −
      
Solving for the prices of high- and low-quality product, we have  
2 ( )
,
3
AD AD
h lAD
h
s s
p
 −=
2( )
,
3
AD AD
h lAD
h
s s
p
−
= *
( )
,
3(1 )
AD AD
h lAD
l
s s
p
t
 −
=
−
 and .
3
AD AD
h lAD
l
s s
p
−
=   
Substituting these prices into demands for the two products yields 
* 2 ,
3(1 )
AD
h
t
D
t
−
=
−
2
,
3
AD
hD = *
2 1
,
3( 1)
AD
l
t
D
t
−
=
−
 and 
1
.
3
AD
lD =  
To solve for an optimal AD duty set by the DC government, we substitute prices and demands 
into the social welfare function of the DC:  
* * *
Producer surplusConsumer surplus Duty revenue
( ) ,AD AD AD AD AD FT ADDC h l DC l l lSW CS CS p p D= + +  + −  
where the last term measures the total amount of duty revenue. It follows that  
 
*
*
1 * *
0
CS CS
2 * *
Duty R
 
[ (1 ) ] ( ) [ (1 ) ] ( )
1
            [ ( ) ] ( )
2
AD
AD
AD AD
h l
AD
DC
AD AD AD AD AD AD AD
DC h h l l
AD AD AD AD AD AD FT AD
h h h h h h l l l
SW s p dF s p dF
p D p D s p p D


    

 
  

= + − + + − 
+ + − + −
evenue
.
 
The FOC for the DC government is:   
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3
( )(3 2)
0,
9( 1)
AD AD AD
DC h lSW s s t
t t
 − −
= =
 −  
which implies that the optimal AD duty is: 2 3.ADt =  
A-2 Effects on DC under the three different trade regimes 
(i) The ranking of DC firm's optimal quality-upgrades 
Given that the optimal quality-upgrades under the three alternative regimes are: (4 4) 9 ,
FT
h hs  = +
(6 4) 9 ,ADh hs  = + and (9 1) 9 ,
T
h hs  = + we have  
2
0
9
AD FT
h h
h
s s


− =  ;AD FTh hq q 
1
0
3
AD T
h h
h
s s


−
− =  ;AD Th hq q   
5 3
0
9
T FT
h h
h
s s


−
− =  if 0.60.   
It follows that there are two possibilities: 
AD T FT
h h hs s s   if  > 0.60.AD T FTh h hq q q     
AD T FT
h h hs s s   if  < 0.60.AD FT Th h hq q q     
R&D expenditures are:
22(3 2) 81 ,ADh hE  = + 2(9 1) 162 ,TDC hE  = + 28(1 ) 81 .FTh hE  = +  We 
have: 
25( 3 2 1)
0;
54
AD T
DC DC
h
E E
 

− + +
− = 
2( 65 14 15)
162
T FT
DC DC
h
E E
 

− − + +
− = >0 if  >0.6. 
It follows that there are two possibilities:  
AD T FT
DC DC DC
E E E  if 0.6; 
AD FT T
DC DC DC
E E E    if 0.6.   
 
(ii) The ranking of DC firm's prices of the high-quality product 
The equilibrium prices of the high-quality product in three alternative regimes are: 
8 (1 )
,
27
FT
h
h
p
 

 +=
2 (6 4)
,
27
AD
h
h
p
 

 += and
(9 1)
,
9
T
h
h
p
 

 +=  
which imply that  
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5 (1 3 )
27
AD T
h h
h
p p
 

  −− = 
T AD
h hp p
  if  >
1
3
 and 
T AD
h hp p
   if  <
1
3
; 
24
0
27
AD FT
h h
h
p p


 − =   AD FTh hp p
  ; 
(19 5)
27
T FT
h h
h
p p
 

  −− = >0 if  >
5
19
; T FTh hp p
  if  <
5
19
. 
It follows that 
T AD FT
h h hp p p
    if 
1
;
3
  AD T FTh h hp p p
      if
1
.
3
   
(iii) The ranking of LDC firm's prices of the low-quality product 
 
The optimal prices of the low-quality product in three alternative regimes are: (6 4) 9 ,ADl hp   
 = +
* (9 1) 9 ,Tl hp   = + 4 (1 ) 27 .
FT
l hp   
 = + It follows that 
* (1 ) 0
3
AD T
l l
h
p p
 

 −− =  ; * *
(1 )
0
3
T FT
l l
h
p p
 

−
− =  . We thus have: .
AD T FT
l l lp p p
     
(iv) The ranking of demands for the high-quality product in the DC market 
The equilibrium level of market demands of high-quality product in the DC market under three alternative 
regimes are:
*1 1,ADhD 
 = − = * (1 ) 1,ThD = − = and 
*ˆ(1 ) 2 3.FThD 
 = − = Thus, the ranking is:
 
.T AD FT
h h h
D D D  =   
(v) The ranking of demands for the low-quality product in the DC market 
The equilibrium demands for the low-quality product in the DC market under three alternative regimes 
are: * 0,ADlD 
 = = 0,
T
lD 
 = = and *ˆ 1 3.FTlD 
 = = Thus, the ranking is: .
FT T AD
l l l
D D D   =
 
(vi) The ranking of DC firm's profits 
Given that the optimal profits for the DC firm under the three alternative regimes are:
28(1 ) 81 ,FTDC h  = +
22(3 2) 81 ,ADDC h  = +
2(9 1) 162 .TDC h  = + It follows that 
25( 3 2 1)
0
54
AD T
DC DC
h
 

− + +
 − =   ;
AD T
DC DC   
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2 (5 4)
0
81
AD FT
DC DC
h
 

+
 − =  ;AD FTDC DC   
2(65 14 5)
0
162
T FT
DC DC
h
 

− −
 − = 
3
 if 
5
  ;  T FTDC DC  
3
if .
5
   
We thus have: 
AD T FT
DC DC DC     if  0.6; 
AD FT T
DC DC DC     if 0.6.   
(vii) The ranking of DC's consumer surplus 
Given that the optimal profits for the DC firm under the three alternative regimes are:
(27 6 4)
,
54
hAD
DC
h
CS
  

− −
=
218 7 9 1
,
18
hT
DC
h
CS
  

− + + +
= and 
(81 8 8)
,
162
hFT
DC
h
CS
  

− −
= it follows that 
(5 2)
0
81
FT AD
DC DC
h
CS CS
 

+
− = 
FT AD
DC DCCS CS  ; 
(25 27 27 4)
54
h hT AD
DC DC
h
CS CS
   

+ − −
− = >0if ˆ;  T ADDC DCCS CS  if ˆ.   
We thus have two possibilities: 
T FT AD
DC DC DCCS CS CS  if ˆ; 
FT AD T
DC DC DCCS CS CS   if ˆ.   
(viii) The ranking of DC's social welfare 
Given that DC's welfare in the three regimes are: 
224 8 81 16
,
162
hFT
DC
h
SW
  

+ + +
=
236 18 81 16
,
162
hAD
DC
h
SW
  

+ + +
=  
281 81 81 10
.
162
hT
DC
h
SW
  

− + + +
=  
It follows that 
(5 6)
0
81
AD FT
DC DC
h
SW SW
 

+
− =  ;AD FTDC DCSW SW   
233 27 15 27 2
.
54
h hAD T
DC DC
h
SW SW
   

− − + +
− =  
 if 0.7;AD TDC DCSW SW    >  if 0.7;
T AD
DC DCSW SW    
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289 81 57 81 6
162
h hFT T
DC DC
h
SW SW
   

− − + +
− =  
 if 0.7;FT TDC DCSW SW    >  if 0.7.
T FT
DC DCSW SW    
We thus have two possibilities: 
T AD FT
DC DC DCSW SW SW  if 0.7; 
AD FT T
DC DC DCSW SW SW   if 0.7.   
A-3 Effects on LDC under the three alternative regimes 
(i) The ranking of prices for the high-quality product in the LDC market 
The optimal prices of the high-quality product in three alternative regimes are: 
4(9 1)
,
27
T
h
h
p


+
=
2(6 4)
,
27
h
AD
h
p


+
=
8(1 )
,
27
FT
h
h
p


+
=  
It follows that 
4(6 1)
27
h
T AD
h
h
p p


−
− = >0 ;T ADh hp p 
4
27
h
AD FT
h
h
p p


− = >0 .h
AD FT
hp p   
We thus have:  
.T AD FTh h hp p p   
(ii) The ranking of prices for the low-quality product prices in LDC market 
The optimal prices of the low-quality product in the three alternative regimes are: 
2(9 1)
,
27
T
l
h
p


+
=
6 4
,
27
l
AD
h
p


+
=
4(1 )
.
27
FT
l
h
p


+
=  
It follows that 
2
27
l
AD FT
l
h
p p


− = >0 l
AD FT
lp p  ;
2(1 7 )
27
FT T
l l
h
p p


−
− = ;FT Tl lp p   
2(1 6 )
27
l
AD T
l
h
p p


−
− =
T AD
l lp p  if 
1
;
6
  AD Tl lp p if
1
.
6
   
We thus have:  
T AD FT
l l lp p p  if 
1
;
6
  AD T FTl l lp p p  if
1
.
6
   
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(iii) The ranking of demands for the low-quality product in the LDC market 
Given that the optimal levels of market demands in the LDC market under the three alternative regimes 
are:
1
,
3
FT
lD =
1
,
3
AD
lD =
1
.
6
T
lD = Thus, we can rank the market demands as:  .
T AD FT
l l lD D D =  
(iv) The ranking of demands for the high-quality product in the DC market 
Given that the optimal levels of market demands in the DC market under the three alternative regimes are:
2
,
3
FT
hD =
2
,
3
AD
hD =
1
.
3
T
hD = We thus have: .
AD FT T
h h hD D D=   
(v) The ranking of LDC's firm profit 
Given that maximum profits under the three alternative regimes are:
24(1 )
,
81
FT
LDC
h



+
=
6 4
,
81
AD
LDC
h



+
= and 4(9 1) ,
81
T
LDC
h



+
= it follows that 
10
27
T AD
LDC LDC
h

 

− = >0 
T AD
LDC LDC   ; 2 (2 1)
81
FT AD
LDC LDC
h
 
 

+
− = >0
FT AD
LDC LDC   . 
Thus, .T FT ADLDC LDC LDC     
(vi) The ranking of DC's consumer surplus 
Given that the optimal profits for the DC firm under the three alternative regimes are:  
81 8 8
,
162
hFT
LDC
h
CS
 

− −
=
81 12 8
,
162
hAD
LDC
h
CS
 

− −
=
81 99 11
;
162
hT
LDC
h
CS
 

− −
=  
It follows that 
         
91 3
0
162
FT T
LDC LDC
h
CS CS


+
− = 
FT T
LDC LDCCS CS  ;
4
0
162
FT AD
LDC LDC
h
CS CS


− = 
FT AD
LDC LDCCS CS  ; 
29 1
0
54
AD T
LDC LDC
h
CS CS


+
− =  .
AD T
LDC LDCCS CS   
We thus have:  
.FT AD TLDC LDC LDCCS CS CS   
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(vii) The ranking of LDC's social welfare 
The optimal levels of social welfare in the LDC under the three alternative regimes are:
28 8 81
,
162
hFT
LDC
h
SW
  

+ +
=
1
,
2
AD
LDCSW = and 
9 27 1
.
54
hT
LDC
h
SW
 

+ +
= It follows that 
4 ( 1)
162
FT AD
LDC LDC
h
SW SW
 

+
− = >0 ;FT ADLDC LDCSW SW   
28 19 3
162
FT T
LDC LDC
h
SW SW
 

− −
− = >0
FT T
LDC LDCSW SW  ; 
9 1
54
T AD
LDC LDC
h
SW SW


+
− = >0
T AD
LDC LDCSW SW  .   
We thus have:  
.T FT ADLDC LDC LDCSW SW SW   
A-4 Effects on global welfare 
We have global welfare, denoted as GW, by aggregating the social welfare of DC and LDC under three 
regimes (i.e., DC LDCGW SW SW= + ): 
( 1)(16 81 16)
,
162
hFT
h
GW
  

+ + +
=
236 81 18 81 16
,
162
h hAD
h
GW
   

+ + + +
=
 
281 108 162 13
.
162
hT
h
GW
  

− + + +
=
 
It follows that 
( 2)
81
AD FT
h
GW GW
 

+
− = >0 ;AD FTGW GW 
 
297 81 76 81 3
162
h hT FT
h
GW GW
   

− + + − −
− =
 
T FTGW GW  if  < ˆ ; FT TGW GW  if  > ˆ ; 
233 27 24 27 1
54
h hAD T
h
GW GW
   

− − + +
− =
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AD TGW GW  if  > ˆ ; T ADGW GW  if  < ˆ . 
Hence, we have two possibilities for the ranking of global welfare:  
ˆ if > ;AD FT TGW GW GW     
ˆ if .T AD FTGW GW GW      
 
 
